

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION**

PATRICK GAYLE,
APARICIO P. JERONIMO,
TOLENTINO MARTINEZ-RIOS,
WILDER PEREZ LIMONES,
JAVIER ANTONIO ARIAS-MARTINEZ,
JUAN CARLOS ALFARO GARCIA,
FERMIN TEPETATE-MARTINEZ,
ABDUL JALLOH,
DARWYN YOVANNY NAVARRETE
SANCHEZ,
MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN,
JOSE CHAVEZ,
LAZARO OCANA GUZMAN,
NAIM ARRAK,
AGANE WARSAME,
HASSAN MOHAMED FARAH,
RUBEN ORLANDO FLORES RAMOS,
MOHAMED HASAN,
ELISEO ANTONIO ZAMORA MENDOZA,
CESAR ARIEL MENDEZ ESCOBAR,

KROME SERVICE PROCESSING CENTER

and

ROSELIN OSTINE,
TAHIMI PEREZ,
FRANKLIN RAMOS GONZALEZ,
FRANCISCO RIVERO VALERON,
IRVIN MEDOZA SILIS,
GERARDO VARGAS,
DAIRON BARREDO SANCHEZ

GLADES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER

and

RENE JONATHAN ROSAS CARDENAS,
ADRIAN SOSA FLETES,
ALEJANDRO FERREIRA BORGES,

HEARING REQUESTED

Case No.: _____

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND COM-
PLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

CLASS ACTION

MAIKEL BETANCOURT,
GELBER SONTAY FUNEZ,
SIRVANILDO BIBIANO SOARES,
MAYKEL VALERA RAMIREZ,
ERVIN DAVID RODAS PEDRO

BROWARD TRANSITIONAL CENTER

Petitioners-Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated.

v.

MICHAEL W. MEADE,
Field Office Director, Miami Field Office,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

and

WILLIAM P. BARR,
United States Attorney General,

Respondents-Defendants.

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

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INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioners-Plaintiffs (hereafter “Petitioners”) are women and men detained by Respondents-Defendants in civil immigration detention at three Florida detention centers within the jurisdiction of the Miami Field Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). All Petitioners are at imminent risk of contracting coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) as a result of their inability to follow Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) guidelines and state and local directives due to their continued detention. This action challenges the refusal of Respondents to release Petitioners, and others in the class they represent, so that they can shelter in place, follow CDC guidelines, and reduce their likelihood of infection and illness.

2. Federal judges across the country have ordered the urgent release of noncitizens, explaining the pressing health risks created by detaining groups of people at this time.¹

3. On April 8, 2020, U.S. District Court Judge William G. Young ordered ICE to release detained individuals because of the COVID-19 threat: “The situation is urgent and unprece-

¹ See, e.g., *Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr*, 2020 WL 1429877 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2020); *Martin Munoz v. Wolf*, Case No. 20-cv-00625-TJH-SHK (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020), ECF No. 14; *Robles Rodriguez v. Wolf*, 20-cv-00627-TJH-GJS (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020), ECF No. 37; *Hernandez v. Wolf*, CV 20-60017-TJH (KSx)(C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020), ECF No. 17; *Arana v. Barr*, 2020 WL 1502039 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020); *Xuyue Zhang v. Barr*, 2020 WL 1502607 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2020); *Basank v. Decker*, 2020 WL 1481503 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020); *Castillo v. Barr*, 2020 WL 1502864 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2020); *Thakker v. Doll*, No. 1:20-cv-00480-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020), ECF No. 47; *Coronel v. Decker*, 2020 WL 1487274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020); *Fraihat v. Wolf*, No. ED CV 20-00590 TJH (KSx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020); *Calderon Jimenez v. Wolf*, No. 18 Civ. 10225 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2020), ECF No. 507; *United States v. Stephens*, 2020 WL 1295155, at *2 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020); *Matter of Extradition of Toledo Manrique*, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020).

dented, and . . . a reduction in the number of people who are held in custody is necessary.” Memorandum and Order at 28, *Savino v. Souza*, Case No. 1:20-cv-10617-WGY (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020) (DE 64) (copy at Appx. I, Exh. A, 1-29).

4. The spread of COVID-19 in ICE detention in Florida has been marked by secrecy and cover-up.

5. As early as March 27, 2020, local attorneys reported to their voluntary bar association that their “clients have indicated there are sick individuals in detention locally, quarantined individuals, and detainees wearing protective gear.” (Appx I, Exh. J, at 30-32, 30 ¶1.). After a bar association liaison member asked ICE if there were detained individuals who had tested positive, she reported back to membership that “there has been NO CONFIRMATION by ICE of detainees at BTC or Krome who have tested positive for COVID-19” and referred members to ICE’s website where it reports confirmed positive cases. (*Id.*) (emphasis in original).

6. On Monday, April 6, 2020, the Miami Herald reported that two officers working at Krome Service Processing Center in Miami had tested positive for COVID-19, and many others were awaiting results from their tests. (Appx I, Exh. C, at 33-38.)

7. On that same day, ICE told the Herald that *no* detained individuals in Florida had tested positive. (Appx I, Exh. D, at 39-46, 40-41) (“For weeks—and as recently as Monday—US Immigration and Customs Enforcement has repeatedly told the Herald that no detainees in their custody in Florida have tested positive for the virus.”).

8. ICE’s statement was false. On April 7, the Herald ran a second story explaining that a detained individual from Krome *had* tested positive. A federal official with first-hand knowledge had told the Herald: “While that is true that no detainee currently at the detention

center tested positive for COVID-19, it's also not completely accurate as testing is not conducted on site and detainees are sent to an off-site hospital to be tested.” (Appx I, Exh. D, at 41.)

9. ICE now admits that there are least two detained individuals in Miami who have tested positive for COVID-19, one currently at Krome, and a second at a local hospital in Miami.²

10. ICE refuses to disclose whether third-party contractors test positive for COVID-19, providing them a “loophole” to reporting the actual number of COVID-19 cases among its employees in detention centers. Third-party contractors comprise a majority of employees in detention centers. (Appx I, Exh. D, at 35-36.)

11. COVID-19 threatens every woman and man detained at Krome Service Processing Center (“Krome”), Glades County Detention Center (“Glades”), and Broward Transitional Center (“BTC”). A chart of the reported COVID-19 cases of people in ICE detention depicts an alarming steep curve. (Appx I, Exh. E, at 47); *see also* Declaration of Dr. Joseph Shin, MD, MSc dated April 13, 2020 (“Shin Decl.”) ¶¶39-41(Exh. 2).

12. Although Krome, Glades, and BTC are run by private prison groups, independent contractors, and a county, these groups have *no* authority to release a person. Only the federal government Respondents can provide the remedy requested by this action.

13. Each of the three detention centers either has confirmed cases of the virus or has groups of individuals herded together in “cohort quarantine” because they have been exposed. Rather than mitigate the risk of transmission, these cohort quarantines drastically increase the

² **ICE Guidance on COVID-19, (last updated Apr. 10, 2020, 5:35 PM), available at:**
<https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus>.

possibility of transmission, infection, and facility-wide outbreak by grouping together people who have already been exposed to the virus. *See* Shin Decl. ¶40 (Exh. 2) (“The analysis that I provide above regarding screening, ‘cohorting’ and social distancing is not theoretical. In fact, there are a growing number of facilities throughout the country where the rate of infection is growing exponentially amongst both people detained as well as staff. In these settings, hundreds, and potentially thousands of people will become infected, and many will die.”); Greer Decl., ¶30 (Exh. 3).

14. Under CDC Guidelines, which detention centers are required to follow, people exposed to COVID-19 should be put in *individual*, not group, quarantine: “Facilities should make *every possible effort* to quarantine close contacts of COVID-19 cases individually.” CDC Interim Guidance (Appx I, Exh. F, at 66) (emphasis added). Cohort quarantine “should only be practiced *if there are no other available options.*” (*Id.*) (emphasis added). As the CDC explains, “[c]ohorting multiple quarantined close contacts of a COVID-19 case could transmit COVID-19 from those who are infected to those who are uninfected.” (*Id.*)

15. “Facilities without onsite healthcare capacity, or *without sufficient space to implement effective quarantine*, should coordinate with local public health officials to ensure that close contacts of COVID-19 cases will be effectively quarantined and medically monitored.” (Appx I, Exh. F, at 66) (emphasis added). Additionally, “[f]acilities with limited onsite medical isolation, quarantine, and/or healthcare services should coordinate closely with state, local, tribal, and/or territorial health departments when they encounter a confirmed or suspected case, in order to ensure effective medical isolation or quarantine, necessary medical evaluation and care, and medical transfer if needed.” (Appx I, Exh. F, at 62.)

16. Respondents are defying CDC Guidelines by refusing to do the one thing they could to do comply with those guidelines – releasing individuals during the pandemic. Instead respondents are affirmatively putting detained people at risk by confining them in close sleeping, eating, and living quarters at Krome, Glades, and BTC. Because Respondents could release Petitioners and those similarly situated, “cohort quarantine” is *not* the only “available option.” As Dr. Shin warns “[t]here is no way for immigration detention facilities to comply with CDC guidelines on social distancing and quarantining unless Respondents release detained men and women on a large scale. When release from a detained setting is an option and there is lack of testing ability and an inability to employ social distancing, it is my professional opinion that failure to release during the COVID-19 pandemic is a violation of the CDC guidelines and will result in continued and wide-spread infection.” Shin Decl., ¶39 (Exh. 2).

17. There is currently no way for Krome, Glades, and BTC to comply with CDC guidelines on social distancing and quarantining. Each facility holds individuals in close proximity. People are less than six feet away from each other when they sleep, eat, and use common areas. It is impossible for Petitioners to protect themselves from infection through social distancing and vigilant hygiene—the only known mitigation measures.

18. ICE continues to arrest people and send them to Krome, Glades, and BTC.

19. ICE continues to issue detainers to local jails, directing them to hold people whose criminal custody has come to an end. ICE then transports these people to Krome, Glades, and BTC, increasing their already large populations.

20. Under these circumstances, COVID-19 will “spread like wildfire,” according to a former high-level ICE official. (Appx I, Exh. G, at 74-81, 75-76 ¶6) (declaration of John Sandweg, Former Acting Director of ICE).³ The World Health Organization, recognizing the threat to detained people, has urged that “[e]nhanced consideration should be given to resorting to *non-custodial* measures at all stages of the administration of criminal justice, including at the pre-trial, trial and sentencing as well as post-sentencing stages.” (Appx I, Exh. H, at 82-121, 92) (WHO Interim Guidance) (emphasis added). This guideline applies to “immigration detention settings” as well. (*Id.*, at 95 §5.)

21. Respondents cannot control the spread of COVID-19 without widespread testing. See Shin Decl., ¶¶ 28, 33 and 39 (Exh. 2). (“The lack of wide-spread testing, transparency and data in communities in the US and all across the world allowed undetected spread in the community as well as within facilities and institutions that fueled the current pandemic.”). However, as ICE has admitted through Officer in Charge at Krome, they are not testing at the facilities. (Appx I, Exh. I, at 122-25, 123 ¶ 8-9) (noting medical screening that does not include testing or testing upon presentation of symptoms). Tests typically only occur if a person is brought to the hospital. Periodic testing of already symptomatic people does little to prevent further infections. As Dr. Shin explains, “three studies that support the likelihood that asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic individuals can spread the infection. These studies took place in China, Japan and one

³ See also Camilo Montoya-Galvez, CBS News, “*Powder kegs*”: Calls grow for ICE to release immigrants to avoid coronavirus outbreak (last updated Mar. 19, 2020), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-ice-release-immigrants-detention-outbreak/>.

study included passengers from the Diamond Princess. These studies found that in COVID infected persons, 59%, 31% and 18%; respectively, were asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic.”

See Shin Decl., ¶24 (Exh. 2).

22. Detainee reports from all three facilities document that social distancing is impossible, people exhibiting flu-like symptoms are housed in the general population, and maintaining personal hygiene is constrained by the crowded facilities and lack of cleaning supplies. At BTC and Glades, men and women must ration soap weekly—two smalls bottles at BTC per person, and one 4-ounce bottle at Glades. (Appx I, Exh. J, at 126-30) (Declaration of Francis L. Conlin, Friends of Miami-Dade Detainees).

23. Detained individuals have not been trained on how to use hygiene and social distancing to try and reduce the spread of COVID-19. Detained individuals have no access to personal protective equipment (“PPE”), not even through commissary. Only some facility staff use PPE.

24. COVID-19 infections at Krome, Glades, and BTC affect the larger community, as many people travel in and out of these facilities, including staff and vendors. As of April 12, 2020, there were 10,007 confirmed cases of COVID-19 between Miami-Dade County, Broward County, and Glades County.⁴ These numbers amount to over half of the total number of positive cases in the entire state of Florida, and are growing exponentially each passing day.⁵

⁴ *What you need to know now about COVID-19 in Florida*, Florida Health (last updated Apr. 12, 2020, 6:44 PM), <https://floridahealthcovid19.gov/>.

⁵ As of April 12, 2020, there were 19, 895 positive cases of COVID-19 in the state of Florida. *Id.*

25. Throughout the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is infecting and killing women, men, and children. The United States has now surpassed the rest of the world in both the number of confirmed cases and the highest number of deaths. Over 22, 000 Americans have died.⁶ Experts estimated that, after the pandemic runs its course, the coronavirus will have infected between 160 and 214 million people and taken the lives of up to 1.7 million people in the United States alone.⁷

26. There is no vaccine against COVID-19 and no known cure. Currently, the only recognized strategies to reduce the risk of exposure to COVID-19 are social distancing, widespread testing, and improved hygiene, which have led to unprecedented public health measures around the world.

27. Given this reality, the President has declared a national emergency. Every state in the Union and the District of Columbia have declared states of emergency.⁸ Numerous states and localities—including Florida and many of its cities and counties—have issued “shelter-in-place” orders requiring residents to stay in their homes. School mandated closures are in effect in all fifty states. These measures all seek to reduce the spread of the virus and, ultimately, save lives.

⁶ Elena Renken and Daniel Wood, *Map: Tracking The Spread of The Coronavirus In The U.S.*, NPR (Apr. 12, 2020, 8:15 PM), <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/16/816707182/map-tracking-the-spread-of-the-coronavirus-in-the-u-s>.

⁷Sheri Fink, *Worst-Case Estimates for U.S. Coronavirus Deaths*, The New York Times (last updated Marc. 18, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/coronavirus-deaths-estimate.html>

⁸ *State Data and Policy Actions to Address Coronavirus*, KFF (Apr. 10, 2020), <https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-address-coronavirus>.

28. Unfortunately, ICE is preventing people at Krome, Glades, and BTC from complying with sheltering in place protocols and CDC guidelines. Despite warnings from medical and public health professionals that releasing detained immigrants is the only viable option to comply with social distancing, individual quarantine, and other CDC requirements and local and state orders, the agency has generally refused to release in any meaningful way, in the absence of court intervention.

29. Petitioners bring this action to remedy ICE's violation of their constitutional rights and protect themselves—as well as others in immigration detention at Krome, BTC, and Glades—from the imminent harm that will result from their continued detention.

PARTIES

30. Petitioner **PATRICK GAYLE** is a citizen of Jamaica and lawful permanent resident of the United States who is detained at Krome. He has been in ICE custody since March 12, 2020. He was exposed to a person in the facility who was coughing and sick. Krome staff have put him in a cohort quarantine with 120 other detained individuals who have been exposed to the virus. It is impossible for him to engage in social distancing, and he is afraid of contracting COVID-19. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. If released, he has two places to stay that will minimize the possibility of contracting the virus. He plans to stay with his father in Garden City, Georgia or with his girlfriend in Daytona, Florida. At both places, he will be able to follow CDC, state, and local guidelines by sheltering in place, practicing social distancing, and maintaining good hygiene.

31. Petitioner **APARICIO P. JERONIMO** is a citizen of Guatemala who is detained at Krome. He has been in ICE custody since March 2020. He is exhibiting [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and is housed in a room with around 70 other detained individuals, many of whom are exhibiting flu like symptoms as well. He is concerned that tests for COVID-19 are not being provided to sick individuals in detention. If released, he will stay with a friend where he can practice safe distancing and take care of himself.

32. Petitioner **RENE JONATHAN ROSAS CARDENAS** is a citizen of Cuba who is detained at the BTC and eligible for adjustment under the Cuban Adjustment Act. He has been in ICE custody since January 9, 2019. He is worried that the crowded conditions of having to sleep in bunkbeds less than a meter away from each other, and the lack of soap to wash his throughout the day will result in him contracting COVID-19. If released, he will stay with his lifelong friend in Miami, Florida, where he will have space to stay isolated and practice social distancing.

33. Petitioner **ROSELINE OSTINE** is a citizen of Haiti who is detained at Glades. She suffers from [REDACTED]. She is extremely worried about the high risk of death if exposed to COVID-19 because of her medical condition, and stress exacerbates her [REDACTED]. She is already experiencing [REDACTED]. Roseline is also worried because most officers still do not wear masks when around detained individuals and they are not provided with sufficient sanitary products to help them stop the spread of disease. If released, she will live with her son in Miami, Florida, where she will be able to self-quarantine and practice social distancing.

34. Petitioner **TOLENTINO MARTINEZ-RIOS** is a citizen of Mexico who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 5, 2020. He is concerned about contracting COVID-19 because he is aware that at least one detained person at Krome has tested positive. Because Mr. Martinez-Rios is forced to live with a large group of people in close sleeping, eating and living quarters, it is impossible for him to practice social distancing. If released, he can return to where he lived before detention with Meyling Osorio. His room is separated from the rest of the members of the household, so he could self-isolate and practice safe social distancing.

35. Petitioner **ADRIAN SOSA FLETES** is a citizen of Cuba who is detained at Broward Transitional Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 9, 2019 and is eligible for adjustment under the Cuban Adjustment Act. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is worried because detained individuals are not given masks or gloves, are not able to social distance, and are not given much soap. He is concerned that he will contract COVID-19 because he has heard of detained people being infected by it and new detained people have been transferred to BTC. If he is released, he will live with his cousin in Orlando, Florida.

36. Petitioner **WILDER PEREZ LIMONES** is a citizen of Mexico who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 2020. He is suffering from [REDACTED], and has been put into a quarantine with 59 men in one unit. He is worried that he has been exposed to COVID-19, because a staff person told him that someone had tested positive before he was placed into a quarantine, and a lot of the men in

his unit are very sick. If released, he has two places to stay in Lake Worth, with his partner and children and with his brother, where he can practice social distancing and self-quarantine.

37. Petitioner **JAVIER ANTONIO ARIAS-MARTINEZ** is a citizen of the Dominican Republic and lawful permanent resident of the United States who is detained by ICE at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since on or around January 6, 2020. He is [REDACTED]. He is in a pod of about 70 men, and more men are being brought into the pod regularly, so he is worried about the impossibility of social distancing. Many men in the pod are sick, and there is a lack of sanitation supplies. He is worried about the complications [REDACTED] would have if he were to contract COVID-19, especially being in such close proximity to sick men. If released, he can live with his son and the mother of his son in Orlando, Florida where he would be able to practice safe social distancing and self-isolate.

38. Petitioner **ALEJANDRO FERREIRA BORGES** is a citizen of Cuba who is detained at Broward Transitional Center. He will be eligible for a green card this month under The Cuban Adjustment Act. He has been in ICE custody since April 26, 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He is afraid of what will happen if he contracts COVID-19 and falls severely ill because he has seen that detained individuals usually do not receive medical attention until it is an emergency and he has seen several people coughing, who have not been placed in quarantine. If he is released, he will live with his friend in Palm Beach, Florida, where he was living prior to being detained.

39. Petitioner **TAHIMI PEREZ** is a lawful permanent resident of the United States who is detained at Glades County Detention Center since January 2020. Tahimi suffers from

[REDACTED] She is worried about contracting COVID-19, which would be fatal due to her poor health. The cells and pods are so small Tahimi cannot practice social distancing, and many of the people in her pod are sick. If released from detention, she would live with her partner in Hialeah, Florida where she would be able to self-quarantine and practice social distancing.

40. Petitioner **FRANKLIN RAMON GONZALEZ** is a national of the Dominican Republic who has been detained at Glades County Detention Center since February 24, 2020. He had [REDACTED]. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Due to these existing health issues, in particular those related to [REDACTED] he is at a high risk for fatal complications if he were to contract COVID-19. His cellmates are very sick, and there is no way to socially distance in his Pod or cell because there is not enough room. If released, he will live with his brother in Kissimmee, Florida where he will be able to practice social distancing.

41. Petitioner **MAIKEL BETANCOURT** is a citizen of Cuba who is detained at Broward Transitional Center and eligible for adjustment under the Cuban Adjustment Act. He has been in ICE custody since March 26, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] His [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will make him more vulnerable to severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. He is worried because most of the time it is impossible for him to social distance. If released, he will live with his aunt in New Jersey, where she has a separate room for him to self-isolate.

42. Petitioner **FRANCISCO RIVERO VALERON** is a lawful permanent resident of the United States who is detained by ICE at Glades County Detention Center. He has been in ICE custody since January 26, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He is prescribed [REDACTED] his medical conditions. As a consequence of his health conditions, he is at high risk for severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. There are 96 detainees in his pod, and all 96 men have to share one toilet. If released, he will live with his wife in Naples, Florida where he will follow all recommendations from the CDC.

43. Petitioner **GELBER SONTAY FUNEZ** Is a citizen of Guatemala who is detained by ICE at Broward Transitional Center. He has been in ICE custody since approximately October 28, 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There have been groups of men transferred into BTC, and he is unsure if they have been tested for COVID-19. He is concerned because he has been [REDACTED] but he has not been tested for COVID-19 or had his temperature taken. If he is released, he will live with his wife or his sponsor in Lehigh Acres, Florida.

44. Petitioner **JUAN CARLOS ALFARO GARCIA** is a citizen of Mexico and asylum seeker who is detained by ICE at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since on or around March 6, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED] which puts him at high risk for severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. He is worried because many men in his cell have fevers and coughs. When they are in their unit, it is impossible to maintain social distance. If released, he would be able to stay with his wife in Florida where he would be able to practice social distancing.

45. Petitioner **FERMIN TEPETATE-MARTINEZ** is a citizen of Mexico who is detained by ICE at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since on or around March 21, 2020. He is afraid that being unable to stay six feet apart from people and the lack of soap and hand sanitizer to wash his hands throughout the day, will put him at risk of contracting of COVID-19. If released, he would be able to stay with his fiancé and her family in Clearwater, Florida, where there is a room available for him to self-quarantine and isolate, per the CDC guidelines.

46. Petitioner **IRVIN MENDOZA SILIS** is a citizen of Mexico who is detained by ICE at Glades County Detention Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 6, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED] As a consequence of his health conditions, he is at high risk for severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. There are not sufficient hygiene products, and it is impossible to maintain a safe social distance because there are six men in each cell. If released, Irvin would live with his mother and wife in Largo, Florida.

47. Petitioner **GERARDO VARGAS** is a 57-year-old legal permanent resident of the United States who is detained by ICE at Glades County Detention Center. He has been in ICE custody since on or around December 10, 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED], an underlying condition that makes him susceptible to fatal complications if he were to become sick with COVID-19. The unit is crowded with 96 men, and a lot of new detained individuals are being brought in. It is impossible to maintain six feet of distance, and there is no access to masks, gloves, or hand sanitizer. If released, Gerardo will live with his family in Wachula, Florida where he will be able to follow social distancing guidelines.

48. Petitioner **SIRVANILDO BIBIANO SOARES** is a citizen of Brazil who is detained by ICE at Broward Transitional Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 6, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is concerned that he is at high risk of severe illness or death if he is exposed to COVID-19. He is concerned because he has been experiencing [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and he has seen a high number of detained people transferred to the hospital.

49. Petitioner **ABDUL JALLOH** is a citizen of Sierra Leone and legal permanent resident of the United States who is detained by ICE at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since November 28, 2018. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] As a consequence of his [REDACTED] he is at high risk for severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. He is concerned because men in his unit are coughing, and there are not proper precautions being taken to protect the medically vulnerable. If released, he would be able to live with his uncle in Virginia, who is a nurse and who would be able to provide him with the proper medical attention and education.

50. Petitioner **DARWYN YOVANNY NAVARRETE SANCHEZ** is a citizen of Honduras who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 19, 2020. He is a long-time smoker and suffers from [REDACTED]. He is worried because smokers are at risk for lung damage, leading to fatal complications with COVID-19. His concerns are exacerbated by the lack of ability to social distance, and the lack of

personal protective equipment or sanitary supplies in the facility. If released, he would be able to stay with his girlfriend in Miami, Florida where he would be able to self-isolate and self-quarantine.

51. Petitioner **MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN** is a citizen of Pakistan who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since December 10, 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. As a consequence of his health conditions, he is at high risk for severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. He is worried because there are approximately 45 other detained individuals housed with him, and it is impossible for them to remain six feet apart. If released, he would go back home and live with his wife and children in Tamarac, Florida.

52. Petitioner **JOSE CHAVEZ** is a citizen of Honduras who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since July 19, 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED]. He has a history of being hospitalized for [REDACTED] due to his poor health. As a consequence of his [REDACTED] he is at high risk for severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. Jose is in a unit with 41 men, and they are not able to socially distance due to the close quarters in which they are kept. If released he would be able to live with his spouse and children in Davie, Florida where he would be able to practice social distancing and self-quarantine.

53. Petitioner **DAIRON BARREDO SANCHEZ** is a citizen of Cuba who is detained at Glades County Detention Center and eligible for adjustment under the Cuban Adjustment Act. He has been in ICE custody since February 13, 2020. Darion suffers from [REDACTED]

is worried about fatal COVID-19 exposure in detention where other detained individuals are sick and social distancing is impossible. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There are over 90 men in the living unit, and it is impossible to maintain six feet of distance away from other detained individuals. If released, he will live with his partner and child in Orlando, Florida where he would be able to practice safe social distancing and self-quarantine.

54. Petitioner **MAYKEL VALERA RAMIREZ** is a citizen of Cuba who is detained at Broward Transitional Center. He has been in ICE custody since December 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED] for his condition. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
He is worried about contracting COVID-19 because other detained individuals prepare the food and clean the facility, and they do not wear masks, and sometimes gloves, while cleaning. He is concerned that his health conditions, coupled with the fact that he cannot social distance while detained, puts him at a higher risk of contracting COVID-19. If he is released from detention, he will live with his cousin in Pasco, Washington.

55. Petitioner **LAZARO OCANA GUZMAN** is a citizen of Mexico who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 20, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED] which is exacerbated to the point of being unable to speak when sick. He was in a cohort quarantine with 60 men until recently, but even in the cohort he was not able to maintain a safe social distance from the rest of the men. He is concerned about contracting

COVID-19 at Krome, particularly in view of his chronic illness. If released, he would be able to live with his brother in Largo, Florida where he could self-quarantine.

56. Petitioner **NAIM ARRAK** is a citizen of Tunisia who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since July 2, 2019. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is very concerned because he was told three officers tested positive, and he thinks one of those officers has still been working in the facility. Also, staff are not using the appropriate personal protective equipment and are still doing three shake downs of their bunks a day, touching all of the men's personal belongings. If released, he can stay with his adoptive citizen parents in Virginia where he will have his own room to isolate and social distance.

57. Petitioner **AGANE WARSAME** is a citizen of Somalia who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since August 1, 2017. He suffers from

[REDACTED] and was a chronic smoker before placed in ICE custody. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. He is terrified that he will contract COVID-19 because the detained individuals within the [REDACTED] Unit are not being isolated, and a detainee who used to be housed in the unit is now isolated at a hospital. He is within six feet of another person at all times within the [REDACTED]. If released from detention, he will return to live with his wife in Hutchinson, Minnesota.

58. Petitioner **HASSAN MOHAMED FARAH** is a citizen of Somalia who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since October 16, 2017. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is housed in the [REDACTED]. Some of the men in his unit are exhibiting flu

like symptoms, and he is worried because he was told that they ran out of hand sanitizer and there is no more soap. Commissary is now closed. He is also concerned because many guards only wear personal protective equipment when they are being watched by supervisors, otherwise they do not use the equipment because they say do not like using it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If released, he will live with his wife and children in Minnesota where he will follow the Minnesota stay at home order and stay in isolation.

59. Petitioner **RUBEN ORLANDO FLORES RAMOS** is a 40-year old citizen of Honduras who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 9, 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED], and since his time in Krome his [REDACTED] necessitating increased medication. He has also been having difficulty breathing. He is in a quarantine cohort unit and is unable to safely distance himself from the rest of the men. Due to a lack of showers, the men are not able to shower regularly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Some men aren't allowed to use the phone to contact their attorneys because they have reported the guards conduct. If released, he would live with his family in New Orleans, Louisiana where he could take care of himself and separate himself from others.

60. Petitioner **MOHAMED HASAN** is a citizen of Somalia who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since August 2017. He suffers from [REDACTED] and is housed in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Krome staff and nurses are telling him that there are people in Krome

who are very sick. They are forced to go to recreation where it is even more impossible to social distance. He is afraid of contracting COVID-19 because social distancing is impossible in the unit, which houses detained individuals in a small space. If he is released from detention, he can stay with his Untied States Citizen sister in Ohio, a U.S. citizen, where he will be able to practice social distancing.

61. Petitioner **ELISEO ANTONIO ZAMORA MENDOZA** is a 53-year old citizen of Nicaragua who is detained at Krome Service Processing Center. He has been in ICE custody since March 15, 2020. He has suffered from [REDACTED] in the past and was a smoker prior to being in ICE custody. He is afraid of the high risk of severe illness or death if he is exposed to COVID-19 because of his health conditions and age. There are currently about 61 men in his living unit, where beds are about three feet apart. If released, he will return home to live with his wife in Hialeah, Florida.

62. Petitioner **CESAR ARIEL MENDEZ ESCOBAR** is a citizen of Guatemala who has been detained as Krome Service Processing Center since mid-March 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED]. He is worried that his precarious health condition will make him more vulnerable to severe illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. It is impossible for him to practice social distancing because there are too many detained individuals in too small of a space. He is worried because there haven't been increases in cleaning measures, detained people aren't allowed to wear masks, and they aren't given gloves. If released, he can stay with his partner and children in Fort Piere, Florida.

63. Petitioner **ERVIN DAVID RODAS PEDRO** is a citizen of Guatemala who has been detained at Broward Transitional Center since early March 2020. He suffers from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Because of his underlying medical condition, he is at risk for fatal complications if he were to contract COVID-19. He is concerned because he is unable to social distance, especially during meals where everyone is only about three feet apart. If released, he will return home and live with his wife and follow CDC recommendations.

64. Respondent **MICHAEL W. MEADE** is the Field Office Director for the ICE Miami Field Office. The ICE Miami Field Office has complete control over the admission and release of noncitizens detained at Krome, BTC, and Glades. Respondent Meade is the immediate and legal custodian of Petitioners. He is sued in his official capacity.

65. Respondent **WILLIAM P. BARR** is the United States Attorney General. In this capacity, he has supervisory authority over all operation of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) which includes all the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 U.S.C. §1103(g); 8 CFR §1003.0. He is also charged with the administration and the enforcement of the immigration laws under 8 U.S.C. §1103(a). Respondent Barr is a legal custodian of Petitioners. He is sued in his official capacity.

PROPOSED CLASS

66. Petitioners file this action on behalf of a highly vulnerable putative class: all individuals in civil immigration detention, as of the date of the filing of this action, at three Florida detention centers, Krome Service Processing Center, Broward Transitional Center, and Glades County Detention Center. Each individual is at imminent risk of contracting COVID-19 because

of the life-threatening conditions under which they are confined—conditions that violate CDC guidelines and State and County orders as they pertain to COVID-19.

67. Named Petitioners bring this action as representatives of the following proposed class:

All civil immigration detained individuals who are held, or who will be held, by Respondents at the Krome Service Processing Center (“Krome”), the Broward Transitional Center (“BTC”), and at Glades County Detention Facility (“Glades”) as of the time of the filing of this action who are:

Sub-class A: detained individuals with a stable location and/or place of residency in which they can self-quarantine and practice social distancing and hygiene pursuant to the CDC guidelines and Exec. Order No. 20-91 upon release.

Sub-class B: all other detained individuals without access to a stable location and/or place of residency in which they can self-quarantine and practice social distancing and hygiene pursuant to CDC guidelines and Exec. Order No. 20-91 upon release.

Sub-class C: all other detained individuals who opt-out of Sub-class A & B.

68. The proposed class meets the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b).

69. The class is sufficiently numerous.

70. Krome detains an average of 600 immigrant detained individuals at any time, with a population fluctuating between 550 and 875 people since 2006. Southern Poverty Law Center, Prison by any Other Name: A Report on South Florida Detention Centers (Appx I, Exh. K, at 131-234, 152).

71. BTC detains on average 700 immigrant detained individuals at a time, with a mandatory minimum of 500 beds for immigrant detained individuals. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 156.)

72. Glades detains an average of 407 immigrant detained individuals at a time. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 165.)

73. All immigrant detained individuals at Krome, BTC, and Glades are detained under the legal authority of Respondent Field Office Director, Miami Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. *See Masingene v. Martin*, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2020 WL 465587 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2020).

74. All members of the class are bound together by common questions of law and fact – most prominently, whether in the face of the lethal COVID-19 pandemic, the continued civil detention of the class members at Krome, BTC, and Glades in violation of the CDC guidelines placing the class members’ health and safety at grave risk violates their constitutional rights.

75. The named Petitioners are proper class representatives because their claims are typical of the absent class members and because they and their counsel will adequately and vigorously represent the class.

76. Rule 23(b)(2) is also satisfied here because the Respondents-Defendants have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class” through creating and maintaining conditions that put the class at imminent risk of contracting COVID-19, the deadly virus that is currently sweeping the globe.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

77. This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 *et seq.*, as protected under Art. I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (“Suspension Clause”), federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and jurisdiction based on the United States as

respondent under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). This case arises under the United States Constitution; the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 *et seq.*; the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C §§ 701 *et seq.*; and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Court also has remedial authority under to its inherent authority, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

78. While only the federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review removal orders directly through petitions for review, *see* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (b), federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of ICE conduct. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

79. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be brought by anyone “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “[T]he writ . . . shall be directed to the person having custody of the persons detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Accordingly, the proper respondent to a habeas petition is the person who has custody over the petitioner. “[T]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” *Rasul v. Bush*, 542 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2004) (quoting *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit*, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)). District courts are limited to granting habeas relief “within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 USC § 2241(a).

80. Petitioners’ current detention and custody as enforced by Respondents constitutes a “severe restraint [] on [Petitioners’] individual liberty,” such that Petitioners are “in custody in

violation of the . . . laws . . . of the United States.” *See Hensley v. Municipal Court*, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

81. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by DHS. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).

82. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by noncitizens seeking to protect their due process rights. *See Ibrahim v. Acosta*, No. 17-CV-24574, 2018 WL 582520, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018).

83. Pursuant to its jurisdiction, this Court may grant various forms of relief pursuant to its inherent authority, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and has the ability to enjoin federal officials pursuant to *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); *See also Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson*, 223 U.S. 605, 619-21 (1912) (applying *Ex Parte Young* to federal official); *Goltra v. Weeks*, 271 U.S. 536, 545 (1926) (same).

84. Each Respondent qualifies as a person with custody over Petitioners. Congress intended for supervisory officials—like Respondents here, who can do all things necessary to adjudicate the action—to qualify as custodians under 8 U.S.C. § 2243. Section 2243’s custodian requirement applies to government officials who can carry out any court order that may be entered in connection with a proceeding, like ordering Petitioners’ release so that they can shelter in place and comply with CDC guidelines.

85. Whether this Court has both venue and jurisdiction over Petitioners’ habeas petition is contingent on two interrelated issues: who is the proper respondent to the petition; and

whether this Court has jurisdiction over the proper respondent. *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004).

86. The proper custodian for purposes of this statute is the “immediate custodian”—that is, the party “with the power to produce the body” of the petitioner before the court or judge. *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 435 (quoting *Wales v. Whitney*, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)). Respondent Meade is the immediate custodian of Petitioners detained within the Southern District of Florida and those detained under his direction pursuant to contract. See *Masingene v. Martin*, No. 19-cv-24693-WILLIAMS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17134, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2020) (when the warden of the detention facility has no power to produce the petitioner the proper respondent is the director of the ICE field office responsible for overseeing the contract facility where the petitioner is detained); see also *Sanchez v. Decker*, No. 18-cv-8798(AJN), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138363, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019) (same); *Madera v. Decker*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169546, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (same); *Vasquez v. Wolf*, No. 20-55142, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5869, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020) (finding jurisdiction to grant habeas claim for petitioner in custody of field office director in California while detained in Texas).

87. Respondent Meade’s office is located in Plantation, Florida, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Because he is the proper respondent and is subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, Petitioner’s habeas petition is properly before this Court. See *Masingene*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17134 at *9; *Villavicencio Calderon v. Sessions*, 330 F. Supp. 3d 944, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding the New York City Field Office Director subject to jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York because his office is located in New York); *Saravia v. Sessions*, 280 F.

Supp. 3d 1168, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding the local ORR official subject to jurisdiction in the Northern District of California because she was based in San Francisco).

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

88. There is no statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies where a noncitizen challenges the conditions of detention. *See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson*, 872 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989).

89. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is also not required where it would be futile, where administrative remedies are inadequate, and where irreparable harm would result from requiring exhaustion. *See Nierenberg v. Heart Ctr. of Sw. Fla., P.A.*, 835 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (M.D. Fla. 1993).

90. There is no exhaustion requirement where a petitioner asserts constitutional claims that the agency cannot address. *See Tefel v. Reno*, 972 F. Supp. 608, 616 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (*citing Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 872 F.2d at 1560); *see also Crayton v. Callahan*, 120 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Exhaustion may be excused when the only contested issue is constitutional, collateral to the consideration of [the] claim [before the agency], and its resolution therefore falls outside the agency’s authority.”); *Warsame v. U.S. Attorney Gen.*, 796 Fed. Appx. 993, 1006 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Because the BIA does not have the power to decide constitutional claims—like the validity of a federal statute—[certain constitutional claims] need not be administratively exhausted.”).

91. In this case, the Petitioners challenge their detention based on their Fifth Amendment due process rights, and the administrative immigration agencies are without the authority to address and adequately remedy the violation of Petitioners’ constitutional rights. *Matter of C-*, 20

I&N Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (noting that “it is settled” that the immigration judge and the BIA cannot decide constitutional questions). Thus, exhaustion should not be required as to Petitioners’ constitutional claims, because it would be futile as no agency process exists to raise the constitutional claims this Court.

92. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is also not required where it would be futile, where administrative remedies are inadequate, and where irreparable harm would result from requiring exhaustion. *See Nierenberg*, 835 F. Supp. at 1407. Here, requiring exhaustion would cause irreparable injury under the exigent circumstances.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. COVID-19 is a global pandemic that poses a significant risk of death or serious illness to Petitioners.

93. COVID-19 is a highly contagious respiratory disease caused by a newly discovered coronavirus.

94. In some people, COVID-19 causes only mild symptoms or no symptoms at all.⁹ But for others, COVID-19 can result in more serious injury, including respiratory failure, kidney failure, and death.¹⁰

⁹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Symptoms (last updated Mar. 20, 2020), <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html>.

¹⁰ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Clinical Care, (last updated April 3, 2020), <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html>.

95. Infected individuals can face prolonged treatment and recovery periods, requiring highly attentive hospital care and ventilators that are in increasingly short supply. Those who do not die can face serious damage to the lungs, heart, liver, or other organs.¹¹

96. Complications from COVID-19 can manifest at an alarming pace. Patients can go from being medically stable with no need for supplemental oxygen to requiring intubation and ventilator-assisted breathing within 24 hours. Studies estimate that the average length of time from onset of symptoms to hospitalization or the development of severe symptoms is only 7-9 days.

97. Older individuals and those with certain medical conditions are at particularly high risk for serious illness or death from COVID-19.¹²

98. Since the first case was reported in December 2019, the transmission of COVID-19 has been growing exponentially. Worldwide, the number of reported cases climbed from 1 to 100,000 in 67 days; from 100,000 to 200,000 in only 11 days; and from 200,000 to 300,000 in just 4 days.¹³

¹¹ Lisa Maragakis, M.D., M.P.H., *I've been diagnosed with the new coronavirus disease, COVID-19. What should I expect?* Johns Hopkins Medicine (last updated Apr. 11, 2020), <https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/diagnosed-with-covid-19-what-to-expect>.

¹² Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19: People Who Are at Higher Risk For Serious Illness (last updated April 2, 2020), <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html>; World Health Organization, Q&A on smoking and COVID-19 (24 March 2020), www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-on-smoking-and-covid-19.

¹³ Berkeley Lovelace Jr., et al., CNBC, *Coronavirus pandemic is accelerating as cases eclipse 350,000, WHO says* (last updated Mar. 23, 2020),

99. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared the outbreak a global pandemic,¹⁴ and COVID-19 has now touched nearly every country on the planet.¹⁵

100. The WHO has exhorted both immigration and criminal justice decision makers to use “non-custodial measures” to protect incarcerated men, women, and children and to stem the escalating transmission rate. (Appx I, Exh. H, at 92)

101. As of April 12, 2020, the number of confirmed cases worldwide has surpassed one and a half million, including over 560,000 people in the United States. Over 114,000 people have died as a result of COVID-19 worldwide, including at least 22,000 in the United States.¹⁶

102. Nationally, projections by the CDC indicate that over 200 million people in the United States could be infected with COVID-19 over the course of the pandemic without effec-

<https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/23/coronavirus-pandemic-is-accelerating-as-cases-eclipse-350000-who-says.html>.

¹⁴ Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, *WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020* (Mar. 11, 2020), <https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020>.

¹⁵ *Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report – 73*, World Health Organization (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200402-sitrep-73-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=5ae25bc7_4https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200330-sitrep-70-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=7e0fe3f8_2.

¹⁶ Worldometer: Coronavirus, <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries> (last accessed Apr. 12, 2020).

tive public health intervention, with as many as 1.7 million deaths in the most severe projections.¹⁷ On March 23, 2020, the WHO warned that the United States could become the next epicenter of the pandemic.¹⁸ Indeed, on March 26, 2020, the United States surpassed every other country in the world in number of confirmed COVID-19 cases.¹⁹ On April 11, 2020, the United States surpassed every other country in the world in the number of confirmed COVID-19 deaths.²⁰

103. In the state of Florida, transmission of COVID-19 has been rampant. As of April 13, 2020, the number of reported cases in Florida is at 19,895, with the number of reported deaths from COVID-19 at 461, making Florida the state with the 11th highest number of COVID-19-related deaths in the United States.²¹ The counties of Miami-Dade and Broward in South Florida account for half of all Florida cases of COVID-19.²²

104. Due to the lack of widespread testing available in most countries, including the

¹⁷ Sheri Fink, *Worst-Case Estimates for U.S. Coronavirus Deaths*, The New York Times (last updated Mar. 18, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/coronavirus-deaths-estimate.html>.

¹⁸ Sarah Boseley, *US may become next centre of coronavirus pandemic, says WHO*, The Guardian (Mar. 24, 2020), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/24/us-may-become-centre-of-coronavirus-pandemic-who-says>.

¹⁹ *U.S. Now Leads the World in Confirmed Cases*, The New York Times (last updated Apr. 1, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/world/coronavirus-news.html><https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/world/coronavirus-news.html>.

²⁰ *U.S. Surpasses Italy in Total Number of Confirmed Deaths*, The New York Times (last updated Apr. 12, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/coronavirus-live-updates.html.

²¹ Listing of United States Total Coronavirus Cases (last updated Apr. 9, 2020), <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/>.

²² Florida's COVID-19 Data and Surveillance Dashboard (last accessed Apr. 13, 2020), <https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/96dd742462124fa0b38ddedb9b25e429>.

United States, the number of confirmed cases is likely but a fraction of the true number of COVID-19 cases worldwide. As of April 12, 2020, just over 2.8 million tests have been administered in the entire United States; in Florida, only 184,926.²³ Because of the shortage of tests in the United States—admitted to be a “failing” by top infectious disease expert Dr. Anthony Fauci²⁴—the CDC currently recommends prioritizing testing for symptomatic healthcare providers and hospitalized patients²⁵—which means that the number of diagnosed COVID-19 cases may be only the tip of a very large iceberg.²⁶

i. COVID-19 poses a grave risk to Petitioners because it is so easily transmitted.

105. COVID-19 easily spreads through respiratory droplets that an infected person expels when they cough, sneeze, speak, or breathe.²⁷ Transmission can occur if those virus-carrying droplets land directly on a nearby person’s nose or mouth, or when a person inhales these

²³ The COVID Tracking Project, Our most up-to date data and annotations (last updated Apr. 12, 2020, 11:22 PM), <https://covidtracking.com/data/>.

²⁴ Elizabeth Chuck, ‘*It is a failing. Let’s admit,’ Fauci says of coronavirus testing capacity* NBC News (Mar. 12, 2020), <https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/it-failing-let-s-admit-it-fauci-says-coronavirus-testing-n1157036>.

²⁵ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), *Evaluating and Testing Persons for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)* (last updated Mar. 24, 2020), <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/hep/clinical-criteria.html>.

²⁶ George Citroner, *How Many People in the United States Actually Have COVID-19?*, Healthline (Mar. 18, 2020), <https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-many-coronavirus-cases-are-there>.

²⁷ Harvard Medical School, *COVID-19 Basics*, Harvard Health Publishing (last updated Apr. 6, 2020), <https://www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/covid-19-basics>.

droplets or touches a contaminated surface and then touches their mouth, nose, or eyes.²⁸ The coronavirus can survive up to three hours in the air, four hours on copper, 24 hours on cardboard, and two to three days on plastic and stainless steel.²⁹

106. Many people who carry COVID-19 remain completely asymptomatic and may never even realize that they are infected, yet they can still spread the disease.³⁰ Some research suggests that asymptomatic “silent carriers” constitute up to 40% of all those infected.³¹ Likewise, infected people who may eventually develop symptoms are contagious even when they are in the pre-symptomatic phase and may account for 10-13% of transmissions.³² Even interventions that individually isolate or quarantine only symptomatic individuals, therefore, cannot effectively contain transmission.

107. There is currently no vaccine against COVID-19. Nor are there any known

²⁸ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), *How Coronavirus Spreads* (last reviewed Mar. 4, 2020), <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html>.

²⁹ Harvard Health Publishing, *As coronavirus spreads, many questions and some answers* Harvard Medical School, Coronavirus Resource Center (last updated Apr. 1, 2020), <https://www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/coronavirus-resource-center>.

³⁰ Apoorva Mandavilli, *Infected but Feeling Fine: The Unwitting Coronavirus Spreaders*, The New York Times (Apr. 1, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/health/coronavirus-asymptomatic-transmission.html>; accord Maddie Capron, How Many Coronavirus Cases are Asymptomatic? CDC and Other Data Range as High as 50%, Miami Herald (April 1, 2020), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/coronavirus/article241703806.html>.

³¹ *Id.*

³² The University of Texas at Austin, "Coronavirus spreads quickly and sometimes before people have symptoms, study finds," ScienceDaily (Mar. 16, 2020), <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/03/200316143313.htm>.

prophylactic medications that will prevent or reduce the risk of a COVID-19 infection. Wide-spread testing would make it easier to identify and isolate carriers, but testing availability is severely limited in the United States. Therefore, the only effective way to protect people against the risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19 is to limit their exposure to the virus through social distancing—i.e., physical separation of at least six feet from other people, especially individuals who are or may be infected, vigilant hygiene, including frequent and thorough hand-washing with soap and water, and the wearing of masks.³³

108. The high incidence of asymptomatic transmission, alongside the nationwide dearth of diagnostic tests to identify and isolate infected individuals, necessitate strict social distancing measures to interrupt transmission.

109. Social distancing reduces the average number of contacts between people, which lowers every individual's risk both for acquiring COVID-19 and transmitting it to another person.

110. Strict social distancing measures have shown effectiveness in reducing the transmission of COVID-19. On January 23, 2020, the Chinese government instituted a complete lockdown of Wuhan, China, where the COVID-19 outbreak began, to attempt to fight the spread of the virus. They shut down all schools, offices, and factories and banned private vehicles from city streets. This lockdown expanded to other cities in Hubei province in the next several days,

³³ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), *How to Protect Yourself* (last reviewed Apr. 1, 2020), <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html>.

extending to 60 million people in China.³⁴ Following the lockdown, Wuhan saw a sustained decrease in transmission of COVID-19, and two months later, the daily number of reported cases dropped to zero.

111. Throughout the world, other countries have also implemented drastic social distancing measures in an effort to control the COVID-19 pandemic and protect people's health and lives. France, for example, imposed a strict nationwide lockdown, prohibiting gatherings of any size and ordering all residents to stay at home.³⁵ Overall, countries encompassing an estimated one third of the world's population have enacted similar restrictions.³⁶ Across the United States, cities and states are imposing increasingly stringent measures to effectuate social distancing. As of April 7, 2020, at least 42 states, three counties, and nine cities had ordered their residents to "shelter in place" or stay at home.³⁷

³⁴ Amy Gunia, *China's Draconian Lockdown Is Getting Credit for Slowing Coronavirus. Would It Work Anywhere Else?*, Time Magazine (Mar. 13, 2020), <https://time.com/5796425/china-coronavirus-lockdown/>.

³⁵ Bryan Pietsch, 'We are at war': France's president just announced a 15-day lockdown, banning public gatherings and walks outdoors, Business Insider (Mar. 16, 2020), <https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-france-president-macron-announces-15-day-lockdown-2020-3>.

³⁶ Andrea Salcedo & Gina Cherelus, *Coronavirus Travel Restrictions, Across the Globe*, The New York Times (Apr. 1, 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-travel-restrictions.html>.

³⁷ Sarah Mervosh, et al., *Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home*, New York Times (last updated Apr. 7, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html>.

ii. **In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, all levels of government have directed people to shelter in place, and practice social distancing and vigilant hygiene.**

112. On March 1, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-51 directing the Florida Department of Health to issue a Public Health Emergency.

113. On the same day, the State Surgeon General and State Health Office declared that a Public Health Emergency exists in the State of Florida as a result of COVID-19.

114. On March 9, 2020, Governor DeSantis declared a state of emergency for the entire state of Florida, describing the spread of COVID-19 as “a risk to the entire state of Florida.” Exec. Order No. 20-52.³⁸

115. On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a national emergency, and on March 16, 2020, the President and the CDC issued guidance titled “15 Days to Slow the Spread,” advising individuals to avoid social gatherings in groups of more than 10 people and advising older persons and persons with serious underlying health conditions to stay home and away from others.

116. On March 19, 2020, Mayor Gimenez issued Miami-Dade Emergency Order 07-20, adopting CDC guidelines encouraging social distancing and maintaining a 6-foot separation between residents to slow the spread of infection and that events with more than ten attendees either be cancelled or held virtually.³⁹

³⁸ Available at: <https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/EO-20-52.pdf>.

³⁹ Available at: <https://www.miamidade.gov/information/library/coronavirus-emergency-order-07-20-businesses.pdf>

117. On March 20, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-70 to “harmonize” Broward and Palm Beach County with Miami-Dade, ordering the closure of all restaurants, bars, any other alcohol/food service business establishment with seating for more than 10 people, in addition to all movie theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, playhouses, bowling alleys, gymnasiums, fitness centers and beaches.⁴⁰

118. On March 23, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-80, requiring all individuals who fly into Florida from states with substantial community spread to self-isolate in Florida for 14 days or the duration of their trip, whichever is shorter.

119. On March 24, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-83, directing the State Surgeon General and State Health Officer to issue a public health advisory urging the public to avoid all social or recreational gatherings of 10 people or more. Exec. Order No. 20-83.⁴¹

120. On a March 27, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-86, requiring all individuals that drive into Florida from states with substantial community spread to self-isolate in Florida for fourteen days or the duration of their trip, whichever is shorter.

121. On March 30, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order No. 20-89, ordering Miami-Dade County, Broward County, Palm Beach County and Monroe County to restrict

⁴⁰ Available at: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-70.pdf

⁴¹ Available at: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-83.pdf

public access to businesses and facilities deemed non-essential pursuant to the guidelines established by Miami-Dade County pursuant to its March 19, 2020 Emergency Order 07-20. Exec. Order No. 20-89.⁴²

122. This order mandates that essential service establishments not subject to closure shall continue to determine, adopt and maintain reasonable measures to ensure sanitation and cleanliness of premises and items that may come into contact with employees and the public, and such establishments shall take reasonable action to ensure that people adhere to the CDC's social distancing guidelines.

123. On March 31, 2020, the President updated the previously issued CDC guidance, renaming it "30 Days to Slow the Spread," and along with the White House Coronavirus Task Force urged Americans to continue to adhere to the CDC guidelines and expand community mitigation efforts.⁴³

124. On April 1, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued a shelter-in-place order for the state of Florida, effective April 3, 2020, Exec. Order No. 20-91.⁴⁴

⁴² Available at: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-89.pdf

⁴³ Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/03.16.20_coronavirus-guidance_8.5x11_315PM.pdf

⁴⁴ Available at: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-91.pdf.

125. On April 4, 2020, Miami Dade Mayor Carlos Gimenez issued Emergency Order 19-20, ordering that all person outside their homes are encouraged to wear a cloth facial covering consistent with current CDC guidelines. Emer. Order. No. 19-20.⁴⁵

126. On April 8, 2020, Mayor Gimenez extended the state of emergency for Miami-Dade County. Exec. Order Extending Declaration of Local State of Emergency.⁴⁶

B. All experts agree that COVID-19 will likely ravage jails, prisons, and detention centers.

127. Imprisoned populations, including those in ICE detention facilities, are at higher risk for infectious disease, as compared to the general population. Factors that heighten their risk include poor sanitation, high population density, and “a higher prevalence of infectious and chronic diseases and . . . poorer health than the general population, even at younger ages.” CDC Interim Guidance (Appx I, Exh. F, at 48-74).

128. Dr. Shin explains that in detention settings “hundreds, and potentially thousands of people will become infected, and many will die. This is a direct result of a failure to implement the recommended measures at an early enough to stage to prevent illness and save lives. Already, some ICE facilities the numbers of detected COVID-19 infections are growing at an exponential rate. By the time facilities recognize this kind of exponential growth in detected cases, it will already be too late. Therefore, individuals should be released from detention.” Shin Decl.,

⁴⁵ Available at: <https://www.miamidade.gov/information/library/coronavirus-emergency-order-19-20-facial-coverings.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Available at: <https://www.miamidade.gov/information/library/2020-04-08-state-of-emergency-extension-4.pdf>

¶40. (Exh. 2). *See also*, Greer Decl. ¶30 (Exh. 3) (“There is no way for immigration detention facilities to comply with CDC guidelines on social distancing and quarantining unless Respondents release detained men and women on a large scale.”).

129. The conclusions of Drs. Shin and Greer are consistent with the conclusions reached by Drs. Scott Allen and Josiah Rich—experts in the fields of detention health, infectious disease, and public health who advise DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties—who urged Congress on March 19, 2020 to take immediate actions to slow the spread of COVID-19 in ICE detention centers, *including releasing immigrants* to facilitate maximum social distancing—an “oxymoron” in congregate settings. (Appx I, Exh. L, at 235-41.)

130. In March 2020, over 3,000 medical professionals across the United States urged ICE to release individuals and families from detention “to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the harm of an outbreak” to detained individuals, as well as to facility staff.⁴⁷ They warned that social distancing measures recommended by the CDC are impossible in immigration detention and that the capacity for *individual* isolation and quarantine recommended by the CDC is extremely limited. When individual isolation is possible, the medical providers expressed concern that “isolation may be misused and place individuals at higher risk of neglect and death.”

131. Like these and other experts,⁴⁸ Drs. Allen and Rich also warned of the dire conse-

⁴⁷ Janus Rose, *Thousands of Doctors Demand ICE Release Detainees to Stop a COVID-19 Disaster*, Vice.com (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4agp4w/thousands-of-doctors-demand-ice-release-detainees-to-stop-a-covid-19-disaster

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Rich Schapiro, *Coronavirus could ‘wreak havoc’ on U.S. jails, experts warn*, NBC News (Mar. 12, 2020), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/coronavirus-could-wreak-havoc-u-s-jails-experts-warn-n1190000>

quences that a COVID-19 outbreak within an ICE detention facility would have on the community outside the facility. They describe a “tinderbox” scenario where a rapid outbreak inside a facility would result in the hospitalization of multiple detained people in a short period of time, which would spread the virus to the surrounding community and create a demand for ventilators far exceeding the supply. (Appx I, Exh. L, at 238.)

132. Once a disease is introduced into a jail, prison, or detention facility, it spreads faster than under most other circumstances due to overcrowding, poor sanitation and hygiene, and lack of access to adequate medical services. For these same reasons, the outbreak is harder to control.⁴⁹ The severe outbreaks of COVID-19 in congregate environments, such as cruise ships and nursing homes, illustrate how rapidly and widely COVID-19 would rip through an ICE detention facility. On the Diamond Princess cruise ship, for example, approximately 700 passengers and crew on board were infected over the course of three weeks despite the initiation of quarantine protocols.⁵⁰

havoc-u-s-jails-experts-warn-n1156586 (“An outbreak of the deadly virus inside the walls of a U.S. prison or jail is now a question of when, not if, according to health experts.”).

⁴⁹ Christina Potter, *Outbreaks in Migrant Detention Facilities*, Outbreak Observatory (Jul. 11, 2019), <https://www.outbreakobservatory.org/outbreakthursday-1/7/11/2019/outbreaks-in-migrant-detention-facilities>

⁵⁰ *Failures on the Diamond Princess Shadow Another Cruise Ship Outbreak*, The New York Times (Mar. 8, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/world/asia/coronavirus-cruise-ship.html.

133. COVID-19 has indeed already started to spread inside U.S. prisons and jails across the United States, including other carceral systems in Florida,⁵¹ Chicago,⁵² and New York City.⁵³

134. Correctional staff is also an especially dangerous vector for a COVID-19 outbreak within a detention center since they regularly travel back and forth between the outside world and the detention facilities where they work.

135. ICE's past handling of infectious disease outbreaks in detention centers has been inept—foreshadowing the impact COVID-19 will have if Petitioners are not released. In 2019, a mumps outbreak across 57 immigration detention facilities throughout the country led to almost 900 cases of mumps overwhelmingly contracted inside the facilities⁵⁴ before the outbreak spread to surrounding communities.⁵⁵ ICE and CBP facilities have been sites of other outbreaks in just

⁵¹ Florida Department of Corrections, COVID-19 Information, <http://www.dc.state.fl.us/comm/covid-19.html>.

⁵² Timothy Williams and Danielle Ivory, *Chicago's Jail Is Top Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars*, The New York Times (Apr. 8, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html.

⁵³ Emma Grey Ellis, *Covid-19 Poses a Heightened Threat in Jails and Prisons*, wired.com (Mar. 24, 2020), <https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-covid-19-jails-prisons/>

⁵⁴ Leung J, Elson D, Sanders K, et al. *Notes from the Field: Mumps in Detention Facilities that House Detained Migrants—United States, September 2018–August 2019*, MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly, 749–50 (Aug. 30, 2019), <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/pdfs/mm6834a4-H.pdf>.

⁵⁵ See Terrence McDonald, *Bergen County Won't Say if Mumps Outbreak Affects Only Immigrant Detainees*, Northjersey.com (Jun. 13, 2019), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/bergen/2019/06/13/bergen-county-nj-wont-say-if-jail-mumps-outbreak-hits-only-ice-inmates/1448708001>. In addition, in 2019, thousands of individuals in 39 immigration detention centers across the country were exposed to chickenpox. Emma Ockerman, *Migrant Detention Centers Are Getting Slammed with Mumps and Chickenpox*, Vice News (Jun. 14,

the past couple years,⁵⁶ in addition to outbreaks in other prisons and jails.⁵⁷

136. Nationally and internationally, governments and jail and prison staff have already recognized the threat posed by COVID-19 and released detained individuals. Iran,⁵⁸ Ethiopia,⁵⁹ and Texas⁶⁰ and have all begun to release people to mitigate the harm that the impending spread of COVID-19 will cause.

137. One of the largest police forces in the nation, the Miami-Dade Police Department, has ordered its officers to issue citations for all misdemeanor offenses to reduce arrests and jail population during the pandemic.⁶¹ The Broward Sheriff's Office has done the same, estimating a

2020), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb8k5q/migrant-detention-centers-are-getting-slammed-with-mumps-and-chicken-pox.

⁵⁶ Christina Potter, Outbreak Observatory *supra* n. 49, (describing outbreaks of acute respiratory illnesses like influenza, and other diseases like scabies and chickenpox). Both Krome and BTC have had mumps outbreaks, and other illnesses that required quarantine.

⁵⁷ J. O'Grady, et al., *Tuberculosis in prisons: anatomy of global neglect*, European Respiratory Journal (2011), <https://erj.ersjournals.com/content/38/4/752.short> (stating that tuberculosis prevalence among prisoners worldwide can be up to 50 times higher than national averages).

⁵⁸ Babk Dehghanpisheh and Stephanie Nebehay, *Iran Temporarily Releases 70,000 Prisoners as Coronavirus Cases Surge*, Reuters (Mar. 9, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-iran/iran-temporarily-releases-70000-prisoners-as-coronavirus-cases-surge-idUSKBN20W1E5>.

⁵⁹ Bukola Adebayo, *Ethiopia pardons more than 4,000 prisoners to help prevent coronavirus spread*, CNN (Mar. 26, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/26/africa/ethiopia-pardons-4000-prisoners-over-coronavirus/index.html>.

⁶⁰ Dillon Collier, *Bexar County jail population down more than 500 inmates after release of nonviolent offenders*, KSAT.com (last updated Mar. 25, 2020), <https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2020/03/25/bexar-county-jail-population-down-more-than-500-inmates-after-release-of-non-violent-offenders/>.

⁶¹ <https://theappeal.org/miami-covid-19-arrests/>

reduction in arrests and bookings of 60%.⁶²

138. On April 7, 2020, a temporary restraining order was issued from this Court requiring Miami-Dade Corrections to implement health safety protocols in the Metro West Detention Center. Order, *Swain v. Junior*, 20-cv-21457-KMW (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2020) (copy at Appx I, Exh. M, at 242-47).

139. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has instructed prison directors to prioritize releasing federal inmates to home confinement, taking into consideration factors including “[t]he age and vulnerability of the inmate to COVID-19, in accordance with the [CDC] guidelines.”⁶³

C. The Center for Disease Control and the detention standards inform ICE’s duties to people at Krome, Glades, and BTC.

140. Krome and BTC are subject to ICE’s Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011 (“PBNDS”). (Appx. I, Exh. K, at 152, 156).

141. Section 4.3(II)(10) requires that “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for the prevention and control of infectious and communicable diseases shall be followed.” ICE PBNDS (Appx I, Exh. N, at 248-97, 253).⁶⁴

⁶² Two Broward Inmates Test Positive For Coronavirus, As Calls For Release Grow, WLRN (Apr. 2, 2020), www.wlrn.org/post/two-broward-inmates-test-positive-coronavirus-calls-release-grow#stream/0; Opinion: Broward County Jail: A COVID-19 time bomb, Sun Sentinel (Apr. 3, 2020), www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/commentary/fl-op-com-finkelstein-broward-county-jail-threat-coronavirus-covid-20200403-kb7g5zwoinf2pfluw4dsxlda7y-story.html.

⁶³ Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, Memorandum for Director of Bureau Prisons, *Prioritization of Home Confinement As Appropriate in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic* (Mar. 26, 2020), <https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-1826-d4a1-ad77-fda671420000>.

⁶⁴ Full copy available at: <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf>.

142. Glades is subject to ICE's National Detention Standards (NDS). (Appx. I, Exh. K, at 165.) The current governing version of the NDS is the 2019 National Detention Standards for Non-Dedicated Facilities.⁶⁵

143. Under section 1.1(I) of the NDS, covered "facilit[ies] will operate in accordance with all applicable regulations and codes, such as those of . . . the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)." ICE NDS (Appx I, Exh. O, at 304).⁶⁶

144. The CDC has issued an Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 48-73). This guidance stresses the vital importance of ensuring social distancing, proper hygiene, access to testing, *individual* isolation of people who have the virus, and quarantine of people exposed to the virus. The guidance specifically states that it is intended for ICE, as a law enforcement agency with custodial authority of detained populations.

145. The CDC Guidance requires that "detained persons who are close contacts of a confirmed or suspected COVID-19 case (whether the case is another incarcerated/detained person, staff member, or visitor) should be placed under quarantine for 14 days." (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 66.)

146. An individual is considered a close contact if they have been within approximately 6 feet of a COVID-19 case for a prolonged period of time, or have had direct contact with

⁶⁵ Supersession noted at: www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2000.

⁶⁶ Full copy available at: www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2019/nds2019.pdf.

infectious secretion from such a person, such as coughing. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 50.) “Close contact can occur while caring for, living with, visiting, or sharing a common space with a COVID-19 case.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 50, 66)

147. “A confirmed case has received a positive result from a COVID-19 laboratory test, with or without symptoms,” and “[a] suspected case shows symptoms.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 51.) Symptoms “include fever, cough, and shortness of breath.” (*Id.*)

148. Quarantine is “the practice of confining individuals who had close contact with a COVID-19 case to determine whether they develop symptoms,” and it “should last a period of 14 days.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 51.) “Ideally, each quarantined individual would be quarantined in a single cell with solid walls and a solid door that closes.” (*Id.*) “If symptoms develop during the 14-day period, the individual should be placed under medical isolation and evaluated for COVID-19.” (*Id.*)

149. “Medical isolation refers to confining a confirmed or suspected COVID-19 case (ideally to a single cell with solid walls and a solid door that closes), to prevent contact with others and to reduce the risk of transmission.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 51.) “Medical isolation end when the individual meets pre-established clinical and/or testing criteria for release from isolation, in consultation with clinic providers and public health officials” as detailed in the CDC’s Guidance. (*Id.*)

150. “Cohorting refers to the practice of isolating multiple laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases together as a group, or quarantining close contacts of a particular case together as a group.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 50.) “Ideally, cases should be isolated individually, and close contacts should be quarantined individually.” (*Id.*)

151. The CDC Guidance states that detention centers should put people exposed to close contact with confirmed or symptomatic COVID-19 cases in *individual*, not group, quarantine: “Facilities should make *every possible effort* to quarantine close contacts of COVID-19 cases individually.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 66) (emphasis added). Cohort quarantine “should only be practiced *if there are no other available options.*” (*Id.*) (emphasis added). As the CDC explains, “[c]ohorting multiple quarantined close contacts of a COVID-19 case could transmit COVID-19 from those who are infected to those who are uninfected.” (*Id.*)

152. According to the CDC Guidance’s order of preference, the *last* option before a “safe[] transfer to another facility with capacity to quarantine” is cohorting in a detainee’s “regularly assigned housing but with no movement outside of the unit (*if an entire housing unit has been exposed*),” but only if it is possible to employ social distancing strategies “to maintain at least 6 feet of space between individuals.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 67) (emphasis added). “If co-horted, quarantined individuals should *wear face masks at all times* (to prevent transmission from infected to uninfected individuals).” (*Id.*) (emphasis added). The last option of transfer “should be avoided due to the potential to introduce infection to another facility.” (*Id.*)

153. But, “[f]acilities without onsite healthcare capacity, or *without sufficient space to implement effective quarantine*, should coordinate with local public health officials to ensure that close contacts of COVID-19 cases will be effectively quarantined and medically monitored.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 66) (emphasis added).

154. Even stricter quarantining and isolation protocols apply in confirmed or suspected cases of COVID-19 infection. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 62-66)

155. However, the need to “[r]estrict quarantined individuals from leaving the facility (including transfers to other facilities)” is subject to an exception for detained individuals “released from custody.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 68)

156. Release to individualized quarantining and isolation outside of a detention facility serves public health because, as the CDC explains, “[i]ncarcerated/detained persons live, work, eat, study, and recreate within congregate environments, heightening the potential for COVID-19 to spread once introduced,” and “[o]ptions for medical isolation of COVID-19 cases are limited and vary depending on the type and size of facility, as well as the current level of available capacity, which is partly based on medical isolation needs for other conditions.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 49)

157. Additionally, “[t]here are many opportunities for COVID-19 to be introduced into a correctional or detention facility, including daily staff ingress and egress; transfer of incarcerated/detained persons between facilities and systems, to court appearances, and to outside medical visits; and visits from family, legal representatives, and other community members.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 49)

158. “Some settings, particularly jails and detention centers, have high turnover, admitting new entrants daily who may have been exposed to COVID-19 in the surrounding community or other regions.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 49)

159. Further, “[p]ersons incarcerated/detained in a particular facility often come from a variety of locations, increasing the potential to introduce COVID-19 from different geographic areas.” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 49)

160. As for new entrants, the CDC also recommends routine intake quarantining, which means “quarantining all new intakes for 14 days before they enter the facility’s general population (SEPARATELY from other individuals who are quarantined due to contact with a COVID-19 case).” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 61.) (emphasis in original). The CDC further specifies that detention centers should conduct “pre-intake screening and temperature checks for all new entrants” and to put new intakes with symptoms (fever, cough, shortness of breath) in medical isolation. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 57)

161. Further, ICE’s governing detention standards require reporting of the spread of communicable diseases within their detained populations. ICE PBNDS, § 4.3(V)(C)(1) (“Facilities shall comply with current and future plans implemented by federal, state or local authorities addressing specific public health issues including communicable disease reporting requirements.”) (copy at Appx I, Exh. N, at 256-57); *id.*, at § 4.3(V)(C)(1)(h) (“Each facility shall have written plans that . . . shall include: . . . (h) management of infectious diseases and reporting them to local and/or state health departments in accordance with established guidelines and applicable laws.”); *see also* ICE NDS, § 4.3(II)(D)(2) (“The facility will have written plans that address the management of infectious and communicable diseases, including, but not limited to, testing, isolation, prevention, and education. This also includes reporting and collaboration with local or state health departments in accordance with state and local laws and recommendations.”) (copy at Appx I, Exh. O, at 314).

D. Continued detention in the unique circumstances of the current pandemic poses a dire and imminent threat to Petitioners and others at Krome, Glades, and BTC.

162. ICE's knowing and affirmative conduct in failing to address the clear foreseeability of severe outbreaks at Krome, BTC, and Glades, and to take the action of releasing Petitioners, demonstrates a disregard for the rights, well-being, and the humanity of detained immigrants. The continued detention of Petitioners and other detained individuals at Krome, Glades, and BTC is reckless.

163. Despite the global pandemic and shelter-in-place orders across the country and knowing the risks, ICE affirmatively continues to bring *new* people into detention centers and to transfer previously detained people between facilities.⁶⁷ ICE continues to issue detainer requests to counties instructing jail officials to hold people for them past the point of criminal custody coming to an end. ICE then transports these men and women from the local jail to immigration detention at Krome, Glades, and BTC.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, *ICE Guidance on COVID-19* (last reviewed/updated Apr. 2, 2020), <https://www.ice.gov/covid19> (“ . . . our law enforcement officers and agents continue daily enforcement operations to make criminal and civil arrests.”); *see also* Richard Hall, Coronavirus: ICE Crackdown Stokes Fears for Safety of Undocumented Immigrants During Pandemic, *Independent* (Mar. 15, 2020), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/coronavirus-us-immigrants-ice-raids-trump-bernie-sanders-undocumented-healthcare-a9398816.html> (noting that “[i]n New York, immigration advocates have noted a marked increase in ICE activity in recent months, which has not slowed as the coronavirus outbreak has worsened.”). On March 18, 2020, ICE announced it would “temporarily adjust” its enforcement practices during the COVID-19 outbreak, but declined to say it would stop arresting people altogether. Rebecca Klar, *ICE Pausing Most Enforcement During Coronavirus Crisis*, *The Hill* (Mar. 18, 2020), <https://thehill.com/latino/488362-ice-pausing-most-immigration-enforcement-during-coronavirus-crisis>.

164. With respect to people like Petitioners who are already in custody, ICE is violating the CDC guidelines and detention standards in multiple ways.

165. Rather than use *individual* quarantining of people who have been exposed to COVID-19, ICE routinely uses en masse “cohort quarantining.” ICE commends itself for having placed large groups of people who have been exposed to COVID-19 together in the same living space, despite the CDC’s statements that this measure *will facilitate* the spread of the virus among those quarantined and throughout the facility and outside community. (Appx. I, Exh. I₂ at 123 ¶10)

166. On top of the fact that cohorting is supposed to be last option when “there are no other available options” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 6), it is only an option when it is possible to employ social distancing strategies “to maintain at least 6 feet of space between individuals” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 67), because “[c]ohorting multiple quarantined close contacts of a COVID-19 case could transmit COVID-19 from those who are infected to those who are uninfected” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 66).

167. Even in the general case, when a facility is not dealing with a positive or suspected COVID-19 case, or a case of a close contact to a positive or suspected COVID-19 case, detention facilities are instructed by the CDC Guidelines to “[i]mplement social distancing strategies to increase the physical space between incarcerated/detained persons (ideally 6 feet between all individuals, regardless of the presence of symptoms).” (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 58).

168. ICE’s cohorting practice contravenes the CDC guidelines. Cohorting is not the same as quarantine or medical isolation. The CDC guidance makes it clear that cohorting is to be

used *only as a last resort*. ICE, however, is using cohorting as the planned—and primary—response to a known COVID-19 exposure, not a practice of last resort. (Appx. I, Exh. I, at 123 ¶10).

169. Moreover, cohorted groups are confined in spaces that prevent them from practicing social distancing. Cohorted groups are not provided with masks to prevent the transmission of COVID-19, as required by the CDC protocols. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 67).

170. ICE has no plans to place suspected COVID-19 cases in individual medical isolation in which “[e]ach isolated individual should be assigned their own housing space and bathroom,” as the CDC instructs. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 62) Moreover, people who exhibit flu-like symptoms are not always removed from the general population but instead are sleeping and eating within feet of others.

171. Further, many of ICE’s claims of having implemented COVID-19 precautions are either contradicted by reports from detained people, or the procedures they have implemented are ineffective.

172. Social distancing is impossible. People sleep in crowded rooms in bunk beds close together and must eat and bathe in close quarters. People are not provided sufficient soap to be able to comply with CDC hygiene inventory and hand-washing procedures. (Appx. I, Exh. F, at 54-57) The bathrooms in these facilities are often unsanitary and in poor condition. Bathrooms have been identified as a particularly potent vehicle for the spread of COVID-19.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ *Why You Should Flush With The Lid Down: Experts Warn Of Fecal-Oral Transmission Of COVID-19*, Forbes (Apr. 2, 2020), www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/04/02/why-you-should-flush-with-the-lid-down-virologist-warns-of-fecal-oral-transmission-of-covid-19/#6d581edd6eb8. CDC guidelines require detention centers to, “[s]everal times per day, clean

173. Other measures ICE claims to have taken, including temporarily suspending social visitation in detention and screening new detained immigrants for certain symptoms of COVID-19, are insufficient to curb the risk of infection within the detention centers. Detained individuals report that ICE has not implemented the CDC's recommendation that newly detained individuals be in individual quarantine for 14 days *before* joining the rest of the population.

174. Not all COVID-19 patients present with fever or respiratory symptoms. Many may be asymptomatic but still contagious, or have mild or less common symptoms. As symptoms of COVID-19 can present anywhere from 2 to 14 days after exposure, individuals who pass ICE's screenings can expose other detained individuals, as well as detention center staff, if the CDC's new intake quarantining protocols are not followed.

175. Release from custody is both the only effective public health measure to curb increased transmission of COVID-19 and the most practical strategy to protect people like Petitioners from harm.

Krome Service Processing Center

176. Krome is a detention center located at the edge of Miami-Dade County. ICE's contract with Akima Global Services ("AGS"), a third-party contractor, requires a mandatory

and disinfect surfaces and objects that are frequently touched, especially in common areas. Such surfaces may include objects/surfaces not ordinarily cleaned daily (e.g., doorknobs, light switches, sink handles, countertops, toilets, toilet handles, recreation equipment, kiosks, and telephones)." www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html.

minimum of 450 occupied beds. (Appx I, Exh. K, 149.) The population typically oscillates between 550 and 875 persons—far exceeding the contractual mandatory minimum. (Appx I, Exh. K, 149)

177. ICE employs both ICE employees and AGS contract workers at the detention center. (Appx I, Exh. K, 149.) These workers typically live in Miami Dade County or other communities in South Florida.

178. Krome is divided into different housing units, however, all housing units share common spaces which include the recreation area, medical area, and the cafeteria.

179. Each general population housing unit (referred to as “pods”) is an open bay—meaning that there are *at least* 65 bunk bed cots per unit. (Appx I, Exh. K, 149.) The bunk beds are positioned within six feet of each other. The open bay also has a communal space with a table and seating areas, showers, toilets, and sinks. The general population units do not have individual cells.

180. Detained individuals prepare the communal food. Up until very recently, several housing pods ate together in the cafeteria. The cafeteria is now closed due to COVID-19, and housing units are eating together in the communal area of their pod.

181. Krome’s failure to provide adequate medical care has been an ongoing concern. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 141-43, 150). Critical medical care is routinely delayed—sometimes for months—or denied outright. *Id.* An inspection conducted in February 2019 concluded that Krome’s medical care was deficient. Lead Compliance Inspector.⁶⁹ Instead of addressing sick

⁶⁹ *Annual Detention Inspection of the Krome Service Processing Center*, The Nakamoto Group, Inc. (Feb. 14, 2019) available at: https://www.ice.gov/doclib/facilityInspections/kromeSPC_CL_02-14-2019.pdf.

calls twice a day, as the detention standards require, it takes two to eight days to triage a sick call. (Appx I, Exh. K, 150.) When medical issues are addressed, individuals report not being properly treated or not treated at all. (Appx I, Exh. K, 150.) Proving ibuprofen is commonly used as a blanket solution to any and all medical issues. (Appx I, Exh. K, 150.)

182. Because Krome fails to meet detained individual's medical needs under normal circumstances, the medical staff are ill-prepared to provide adequate medical treatment amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

183. Krome has a large population and is often overcrowded. (Appx I, Exh. F, at 149-50) (overcrowding at Krome). ICE can tightly detain up to 1,000 individuals in the facility. (Appx I, Exh. K, 230 (endnote 118).) When the population reaches that number, it becomes dangerously overcrowded with 100 or more people in a pod with 65 beds. To house these numbers, Krome supplies stackable beds placed between bunkbeds, in front of the showers and bathrooms, next to the phones, and in the common television area. (Appx I, Exh. K, 149.) At least one pod, with 120 detainees, is currently in such a crowded state.

184. Overcrowding at Krome has led to many sanitation and health issues. (Appx I, Exh. K, 150.) It becomes impossible to avoid human contact and the unit is harder to keep clean. (Appx I, Exh. K, 150)

185. During the summer of 2019, there was a mumps outbreak at Krome in which housing units were group quarantined.⁷⁰ Ten years before that, there was an outbreak of the H1N1 virus at Krome.⁷¹

186. Detained men at Krome live in pods that house approximately 50 to 120 individuals. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. A, at 1-9); Gayle Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. B, at 10-14).

187. The large number of detained individuals in each pod make it infeasible to stay six feet apart and practice social distancing. *See* Arias-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. C, at 15-21); Jalloh Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Darwyn Dec. ¶ 5(c) (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34); Perez-Jeronimo Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. F, at 35-39); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46); Jalloh Dec. ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Mendez-Escobar Dec. ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. H, at 47-51); Zamora-Mendoza Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. I, at 52-54); Ocana-Guzman Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. J, at 55-60).

188. The pods have bunk beds for the detained individuals to sleep, which are not 6 feet apart. *See* Arias-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. C, at 15-21); Alfaro-Garcia Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. K, at 61-67); Khan Dec. at ¶ 8a (Appx II, Exh. L, at 68-74); Jalloh Dec. ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Perez-Jeronimo Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. F, at 35-39); Chavez Dec. at

⁷⁰ Letter to ICE and Wardens from AI Justice, SPLC, AAAJ, and project South (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/ltr_to_ice_and_wardens_re_covid-19_-2020.03_-_final.pdf

⁷¹ After a Krome employee's toddler contracted H1N1, ICE was criticized for not providing employees with proper protection, training, and information to deal with the virus. Kyle Munzenreider, *Infact Child of ICE Employee Has Swine Flu*, Miami New Times (June 23, 2009), <https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/infant-child-of-ice-employee-has-swine-flu-6565669>.

¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46); Zamora-Mendoza Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. I, at 52-54); Ocana-Guzman Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. J, at 55-60).

189. There are at least three housing units of approximately 48, 59, and 120 people, one of which includes a detained person with prostate cancer, that are under cohort quarantine.

See [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Petitioner Gayle is housed in a quarantined pod with 120 detained individuals, which has a sign on the wall that says the maximum capacity is 80. *See* Gayle Dec. at ¶¶ 6, 12 (Appx II, Exh. B, at 10-14). Detained individuals in these units share toilets and showers that are less than six feet apart. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. A, at 1-9). The room of 48 men has only three urinals and one toilet. Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. N, at 79-83). At least one of the rooms under cohort quarantine still leaves their room once a day to interact with hundreds of other detained individuals in the recreation area, where the men are crowded into a small space. Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. N, at 79-83). During communal meals, individuals are forced to eat in close contact with each other. *See* Mendez-Escobar Dec. ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. H, at 47-51).

190. A recent photograph, from a Miami Herald Article, of one of the general population units at Krome shows men crowded into the common space. (Appx I, Exh. P, at 327-335, 334). None of the men in the photograph are wearing masks or gloves. Men are crowded around small tables. The bunk beds are located within a few feet of each other and of the tables. Social distancing is impossible in this setting.

191. Despite the COVID-19 threat, Respondents continue to detain new people at Krome. *See* Arrak Dec. ¶ 27 (Appx II, Exh. O, at 84-90)

192. Some detained individuals who require additional [REDACTED] care are housed in the Krome Behavioral Health Unit (“BHU”), which is split into two sections. One unit can house 22 people, while the other can house eight people. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Individuals in the BHU typically share a room with another person, and sleep less than six feet apart. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Two detained individuals in the BHU do not currently share a room while sleeping, but are in close contact with others in the unit when in communal areas. *See* [REDACTED]

193. Detained individuals in BHU are required to go to the recreation yard twice a day for an hour, despite complaints that the area is too small to allow social distancing. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The guards threaten them with being sent to the “hole,” or Segregated Housing Unit, unless they go to recreation. [REDACTED]

Some detained individuals feel they need to go into disciplinary housing or remain isolated in their rooms to prevent the risk of infection, but are concerned their mental health conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder, will worsen. [REDACTED]

194. Meals in the BHU are served in the dayroom to all detained individuals at the same time, but there are only two tables and few chairs, and some have to sit on the floor to eat.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The tables and two phones in the dayroom that all detained individuals in BHU use are not being cleaned. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] They only have toilet paper available to clean the tables in the common area, and one man reports using toilet paper to clean his room. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Krome staff bring food in a cart to the unit for all meals, but do not wear masks or gloves despite requests from the detained population to do so.

[REDACTED] The guards laugh at these requests. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

195. Detained individuals are requesting face masks, but staff have not provided them and have said they are not necessary for detainees or are only for officers. *See* Warsane Dec. ¶ 25 (Appx II, Exh. Q, at 98-105); Hasan Dec. ¶ 19-20 (Appx II, Exh. R, at 106-12); Arrak Dec. ¶ 15, 21 (Appx II, Exh. O, at 84-90); Farah Dec. ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97).

196. Soap has not been readily available, and some individuals have not been able to shower unless they had funds to purchase soap from commissary. Warsane Dec. ¶ 17 (Appx II, Exh. Q, at 98-105); Hasan Dec. ¶ 11, 13 (Appx II, Exh. R, at 106-12); Arrak Dec. ¶ 8, 23 (Appx II, Exh. O, at 84-90); Farah Dec. ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97). Even when purchased, detained individuals are not being given these items for several days and are running out of essentials like soap and shampoo. Warsane Dec. ¶ 18 (Appx II, Exh. Q, at 98-105); Hasan Dec. ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. R, at 106-12); Farah Dec. ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97). Hand sanitizer appears to be only available to nurses, who sometimes spray sanitizer on detained individuals' hands

when they are receiving medication. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

197. Individuals taking prescription medication see nurses twice a day, in the morning and evening. [REDACTED] Nurses are not consistently wearing gloves or masks when dispensing medication or checking if the person has swallowed the medication. [REDACTED]. Guards pat down detained individuals several times a day and do shakedowns of bedrooms three times per day, but do not always wear gloves or masks. Warsane Dec. ¶ 29 (Appx II, Exh. Q, at 98-105); Hasan Dec. ¶ 23, 24 (Appx II, Exh. R, at 106-12); Arrak Dec. ¶ 18 (Appx II, Exh. O, at 84-90); Farah Dec. ¶ 12-14 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97). Around April 8, five guards were sent home while others are working overtime. Warsane Dec. ¶ 33 (Appx II, Exh. Q, at 98-105); Hasan Dec. ¶ 21, 28 (Appx II, Exh. R, at 106-12); Farah Dec. ¶ 16 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97).

198. The number of people in all of the general population units is high, and new detained individuals have continued to come in over the past few weeks. *See* Darwyn Dec. ¶ 6(j) (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34); Tolentino Dec. ¶ 6, 11 (Appx II, Exh. S, at 113-17); Tepetate-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 15 (Appx II, Exh. T, at 118-23); Gayle Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. B, at 10-14); Arias-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. C, at 15-21); Khan Dec. at ¶ 8(k) (Appx II, Exh. L, at 68-74). Petitioner Aparicio has seen about 15 new detained individuals in his unit in the last two weeks. *See* Aparicio Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. F, at 35-39).

199. As recently as April 4, 2020, new detained individuals have been transferred to Krome and were not being tested to determine whether they have COVID-19. *See* Jalloh Dec. ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9).

200. At least two of the detained individuals recently transferred to Krome had fevers, one of whom was visibly shaking in the dining room. Both were eventually taken out of the general population. *See* [REDACTED] One detained person who contracted a severe fever was removed from his room in the middle of the night by ICE agents, who were accompanied by police officers carrying guns with rubber bullets. *See* [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The officers would not explain to the other men in the room what was happening, and the next night a new man was brought to fill the bed of the sick man. *Id.* Since then, at least four other men in that sick man's room have developed COVID-19 symptoms, and have not been able to see a doctor. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of these men has asthma, putting him at severe risk of dying from COVID-19. *See* [REDACTED]

201. One detainee tested positive for COVID-19, and the two officers who were watching him also tested positive. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46).

202. Approximately 60 Krome employees have been placed under quarantine, after a total of four staff tested positive for COVID-19. *See* Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. N, 79-83). The facility is so understaffed that some employees are now working 12-hour shifts. *Id.* at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. N, 79-83).

203. Detained individuals have been transported in and out of Krome to hospital and medical visits since the outbreak, potentially having contact with infected individuals. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9).

204. The detained individuals are close together when they eat because the tables and chairs where they eat cannot be moved. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 16 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶ 15 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Tolentino Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. S, at 113-17); Alfaro Garcia Dec. ¶ 16 (Appx II, Exh. K, at 61-67); Tepetate-Martinez Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. T, at 118-23); Tolentino Dec. ¶ 5b (Appx II, Exh. S, at 113-17); Perez Limones Dec. ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. M, at 75-78); Chavez Dec. ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46).

205. Detained individuals are not being provided with masks or gloves, even when they are in cohort quarantine. *See* Portuondo Dec. ¶ 25 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Khan Dec. ¶ 8(c) (Appx II, Exh. L, at 68-74); Escobar Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. H, at 47-51); Zamora Mendoza Dec. ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. I, at 52-54). Portuondo reported that there is one soap dispenser at the entrance to the toilet area in his pod, which was only installed 7 or 8 days ago. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 21 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9). They have a weekly allowance of soap and some use less than needed to make sure not to run out. *See* Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶ 21 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29). Because Krome does not provide enough personal hygiene products, detained individuals must buy them in the commissary. *See* Tolentino Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. S, at 113-17). But the commissary is now closed and people now have to submit a request to order items, which can take anywhere from two days to over a week to arrive. *See* Farah Dec. ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97).

206. There are no masks, gloves, or hand sanitizer available for purchase. *See* Portuondo Dec. ¶ 22 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Gayle Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. B, at 10-14); Arias-Martinez Dec. ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. C, at 15-21); Jalloh Dec. ¶ 22 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Chavez Dec. ¶ 18 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46).

207. When detained individuals try to make their own masks, they are told they are not allowed to cover their faces. *See* Aparicio Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. F, at 35-39); Escobar Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. H, at 47-51).

208. There is no hand sanitizer available in the common area. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Alfaro Garcia Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. K, at 61-67); Tepetate-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. T, at 118-23); Darwyn Dec. ¶ 5(d) (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 16 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46). Detained individuals have reported seeing the guards with hand sanitizer but detained individuals are not allowed to use it. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 16 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46).

209. There is hand sanitizer in the nurse's area where detained men receive medication. *See* [REDACTED] However, detained individuals are only allowed one squirt when receiving medication. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

210. Until recently, Krome staff were not wearing masks or gloves. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 25 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶ 25 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Perez Limones Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. M, at 75-78); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 21 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46). Some officers still fail to wear gloves or masks. *See* Warsane Dec. ¶ 21, 29 (Appx II, Exh. Q, at 98-105); Hasan Dec. ¶ 23, 24 (Appx II, Exh. R, at 106-12); Arrak Dec. ¶ 18; Farah Dec. ¶ 12-14 (Appx II, Exh. P, at 91-97); Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 26 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 22 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46). Guards are seen touching their faces and then things in the pods, such as people, food trays and other items in the living area, and they are not observed washing their hands often. *See* Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶ 26-28 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Alfaro

Garcia Dec. at ¶¶ 10-11, 14 (Appx II, Exh. K, at 61-67); Tepetate-Martinez Dec. at ¶¶ 13-14 (Appx II, Exh. T, at 118-23); Darwyn Dec. ¶ 6(h)-(i) (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34); Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 27 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Chavez Dec. at ¶ 23 (Appx II, Exh. G, at 40-46).

211. Detained individuals have not seen efforts to clean or disinfect areas more frequently. Escobar Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. H, at 47-51). Detained individuals serve the food and clean the facility, but are not provided with masks when working these jobs. *See* Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶ 16-18 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Aparicio Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. F, at 35-39); Tepetate-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. T, at 118-23); Perez Limones Dec. at ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. M, at 75-78). Detained individuals prepare and touch the food, distribute the clothing, and they do not use gloves or masks or use other hygiene measures to help ensure that the virus does not spread. *See* Darwyn Dec. ¶ 6(a)-(d) (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34).

212. Detained individuals report that a nurse said masks were being reused because of supply shortages. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

213. Detained individuals have not been trained on how to limit the spread of COVID-19. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 23 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9). *See* Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶¶ 19, 23 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29); Alfaro Garcia Dec. at ¶ 18 (Appx II, Exh. K, at 61-67); Arias-Martinez Dec. at ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. C, at 15-21); *See* Darwyn Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34). They are only getting information from Krome staff when they or their families ask, but all they are told is that there are thousands of COVID-19 cases in the country. *See* Aparicio Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. F, at 35-39).

214. As of April 7, 2020, detained individuals have had their TVs, phones, and tablets confiscated. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 19 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9). No unit within Krome is allowed to watch TV. *See* Portuondo Dec. at ¶ 19 (Appx II, Exh. A, 1-9); Alfaro Garcia Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. K, at 61-67); *See* Darwyn Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. E, at 30-34).

215. A recent emergency that was announced over the speakers at Krome was due to COVID-19. *See* Abdul Jalloh Dec. ¶ 29 (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29).

216. On April 7, some detained individuals raised concerns about conditions and fears of COVID-19 and guards began beating them. Flores Ramos Dec. ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. U, at 124-30). One person was kicked in the ribs although he was not among those making complaints. Flores Ramos Dec. ¶ 20 (Appx II, Exh. U, at 124-30). The guards are not allowing detained people to contact their attorneys, which that man believes is retaliation in response to these complaints. Flores Ramos Dec. ¶ 21 (Appx II, Exh. U, at 124-30).

217. Since the COVID-19 outbreak at Krome, there has been a decrease in medical staff. *See* [REDACTED] There has been no increase in screenings. *See* [REDACTED] Detained individuals who request evaluation and to see a doctor have had their requests denied. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

218. When someone is sick with cold symptoms, they must wait five to eight days before they can see a doctor. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When other

detained individuals are taken out of the pods for coughing or issues with breathing, the other detained individuals are not told whether they have been exposed to COVID-19. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

219. A detained man was sick with a cough and requested to see a doctor, but was told that he was not a priority. *See* [REDACTED] He was not isolated from the rest of the pod. *Id* (Appx II, Exh. D, at 22-29). Detained individuals have symptoms, including fever, goosebumps, and cough, but the rest of the detained population is not being told what is wrong with them. *See* [REDACTED]

220. If detained individuals have severe symptoms, they are taken to another area and provided with medication for headaches, but then returned to the pod. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When one detainee developed a cough, a staff member took his temperature and gave him two pills, without explaining to him what was wrong with him. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

221. Detained individuals are not getting tested when they are sick, unless they are having difficulty breathing. *See* [REDACTED].

222. The medically vulnerable, due to chronic illnesses, are not being separated from the rest of the population. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

223. On Sunday, April 5, 2020, the Miami Herald reported that the Monroe County Jail ended its 23-year contract with the ICE Miami Field Office, and returned 48 detained individuals to the Krome “in the middle of the night Friday.” “Sources told the Herald that the frequent trips

to the crowded facility in Miami had the sheriff's office uneasy over the possibility that the coronavirus could easily be transmitted." (Appx I, Exh. Q, 336-41.)

224. On April 8, 2020, the Assistant Field Officer Liana J. Castano stated in a declaration to this court that Krome had 3 cases of laboratory confirmed positives for COVID-19 amongst staff and a detained individual, and that at least 238 detained individuals were exposed to a confirmed case of COVID-19. (Appx I, Exh. I, at 123-224 ¶ 12.) These 238 individuals who have been exposed to a person confirmed to have COVID-19 are being placed in "cohorts with restricted movement." (Appx I, Exh. I, at 123 ¶ 10.)

225. The day before, investigating from the Miami Herald was released which suggests that the number of people with the virus is underreported and "not completely accurate as testing is not conducted on site and detained individuals are sent to an off-site hospital to be tested," according to a federal official interviewed by the Herald. (Appx I, Exh. D, at 41.)

226. The Miami Herald's April 7, 2020, report also explained that "[f]or weeks — and as recently as Monday — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has repeatedly told the Herald that no detainees in their custody in Florida have tested positive for the virus. However, the agency got around having to disclose that any detainee was sick with COVID-19 because the detainee was technically no longer on the premises — but rather at a hospital, federal sources say." (Appx I, Exh. D, at 40-41)

227. Also, on April 7, 2020, four members of Congress directed a letter to ICE's Deputy Director Matthew T. Albence, "urg[ing] [him] to significantly limit the number of immigrants held in detention and immediately expand [his] agency's use of alternatives to detention (ATD) for qualified individuals" so that "[a] mass tragedy at Krome and other ICE facilities in

Florida, including Broward Transitional Center and Glades County Detention Center, can be avoided.” (Appx I, Exh. R, at 342-43.) These members of Congress expressed that they were “deeply disturbed by ICE’s continued activity to transfer and detain large groups of immigrants in the midst of a global pandemic, especially at a facility where detainees and employees have tested positive.” (Appx I, Exh. R, at 342)

228. These four members of Congress also stated that “[i]t is undisputed that jails, prisons, and detention centers are highly vulnerable to COVID-19” due to the fact that “[e]ffective social distancing is almost impossible and necessary disinfectant is rarely available to detainees,” and especially so given that the situation in “Krome is particularly alarming in this respect” in light of reported “overcrowded conditions even prior to the impact of COVID-19.” (Appx I, Exh. R, at 342.) They also added that “it appears that Krome is not at all prepared to mitigate exposure to COVID-19, or to adequately respond should an outbreak at the facility occur. These issues are only compounded by the fact that COVID-19 has now reached Krome.” (Appx I, Exh. R, at 342-43)

229. Staff at Krome arrive and leave on a shift basis, and there is limited ability to adequately screen incoming staff for new, asymptomatic infection. Staff generally live in the communities near these facilities—areas where there are confirmed cases of COVID-19.

230. The outbreak at Krome has affected the immigration court housed at the facility and run by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). Krome Immigration Court is accessed through the same lobby as the detention center. Judges, court staff, and both government and defense attorneys have expressed concern about their safety and health.

231. On March 22, 2020, the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”), the ICE Professionals Union (“ICE Union”), and the American Immigration Lawyers Association (“AILA”), wrote a joint statement demanding that EOIR close all of the immigration courts nationwide, and stating, among other things, that:

The DOJ’s current response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its spread is disconnected from the needs and advice of community leaders and scientific experts. The Immigration Courts are especially vulnerable to the spread of the Coronavirus. Every link in the chain that brings individuals to the court, from the use of public transportation, to security lines, crowded elevators, hallways, the cramped cubicle spaces of court staff, inadequate waiting room facilities in the courthouses, and scant sanitizing resources at the courts, all place lives at risk. Individuals who in many instances have waited years for a hearing may also feel pressured to appear – even if they feel sick, for fear of being ordered deported.

(Appx I, Exh. S, at 345-47, 346)

232. On March 26, 2020, the NAIJ, the ICE Union, AILA, and a multitude of other organizations wrote a letter directly to Attorney General Barr demanding the closure of all immigration courts nationwide, and stating that “detained courts must also be closed to in-person hearings in order to minimize the spread of the virus, slow the rate of new infections, and to avoid overwhelming local resources.” (Appx I, Exh. T, at 348-51)

233. On March 30, 2020, the NAIJ issued an additional statement. The statement begins by quoting a “current immigration judge who is a U.S. military veteran” stating:

I don't say this lightly, but EOIR has demonstrated that they need to be gutted and rebuilt from the ashes. I've never witnessed an utter lack of concern for people like I have here. In my former life, we treated captured Taliban and ISIS with more humanity. Moreover, I've never seen worse leadership. A crisis usually brings good and bad to the light. We have nothing but darkness.

(Appx I, Exh. U, at 352-56, 352)

234. That same day, Monday, March 30, 2020, at 7:50 a.m., without explanation, EOIR suddenly announced that the Krome Immigration Court was closed for hearings for two days. (Appx I, Exh. V, at 357.)

235. To date, there is yet to be a public explanation for why the Krome hearings were cancelled so abruptly. There are reports that the judges and court staff at Krome feared exposure to the virus and that the abrupt closure occurred to permit cleaning of the court facilities.

236. The Krome Immigration Court remains closed at this time.

Glades County Detention Center

237. Glades is a county jail in Moorehaven, Florida. It can house roughly 500 ICE detained men and women at a time. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) Detained individuals in ICE custody are split amongst six housing units, or “pods,” four designated for the men and two for the women. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) Depending on the facility’s capacity, pods may contain a mix of individuals in ICE custody, custody of the U.S. Marshals, or under Glades County custody. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 140.)

238. The cells where the detained individuals sleep are small, and there are six detained individuals in each cell, with three bunk beds that are placed close together. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Tahimi Perez ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. W, at 139-44); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50). The detained individuals are only able to maintain about one-meter separation in their cells when they sleep. *See* Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62).

239. Many detained individuals have experienced significant turnover of cellmates, having up to six or seven new cellmates since their detention in Glades. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Tahimi Perez ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. W, at 139-44); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

240. There are approximately 95 detained individuals in a pod at a time. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 17 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62). The pods are so crowded, that social distancing at a safe six feet distance is impossible, especially with the constant influx of detained individuals. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 6, 8 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Irvin Mendoza Silis Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. AA, at 163-67); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62); Tahimi Perez ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. W, at 139-44); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

241. All detained individuals in a pod also share communal bathrooms and showers, which do not have six feet of distance between them, making it impossible to maintain a safe social distance even while using the restroom or bathing. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

242. Unlike BTC or Krome, there is no cafeteria. Detained individuals eat in the communal seating area in their pod, known as “satellite feeding.” (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) The tables used for eating and daily living usually seat four people, but due to overcrowding, they are now seating five to six people at a time. *See* Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-

56). As a result, there is only about 40 to 50 centimeters of separation between detained individuals when they are eating at the tables. *See* Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62).

243. New detained individuals arrive at Glades every day, some already exhibiting flu like symptoms like coughing. *See* [REDACTED]. There is no indication that new detained individuals are tested for COVID-19 or routinely quarantined before being placed in the pod with the rest of the detained individuals. *Id* (Appx II, Exh. BB, at 168-72); Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62); Tahimi Perez Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. W, at 139-44).

244. In all six pods, individuals share many common spaces and touch the same surfaces. All six units and the segregation unit share a common law library. In each pod, there are only four phones available per pod that everyone must share, and people must also share tablets. Similarly, all detained individuals in the segregation unit share the same two phones.

245. There are no sanitizing wipes or cleaning supplies available to wipe down the phones in between calls, therefore the detained individuals are forced to use just a wet paper towel in an attempt to clean the phones before and after use. *See* Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62).

246. Contractors and detained individuals have continuously reported unsanitary physical conditions, lack of medical care, and physical mistreatment. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) Glades has failed to substantively remedy these poor conditions.

247. Unsanitary bathrooms are a persistent problem. The jail forbids the use of bleach for cleaning the bathrooms. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) Shampoo is typically used as a substitute for soap. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) There is mold in the bathrooms. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.); (Appx I, Exh. W, at 367-68) (DHS Office of Inspector Gen. Report OIG-18-32, noting lack of cleanliness, limited hygienic supplies, and potentially unsafe food handling).

248. There have been reports of inedible food provided to detained individuals. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 163.) The “drinking water has a yellowish hue and an odd taste.” (Appx, Exh. K, at 163).

249. The spread of cough, flu, and other respiratory conditions in the dorms have been attributed to the unsanitary conditions. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 162.) Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, Glades failed to provide adequate medical care to detained women and men. (Appx I, Exh. E, at 58-60; 80-81.)⁷²

250. Glades only has one doctor in the facility, who is only available four times a week. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 163.) Critical medical care is routinely delayed—sometimes for months—or denied outright. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 141-42; 163-64). When medical requests are finally addressed, individuals report not being properly treated or not treated at all. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 163.) Providing ibuprofen or Tylenol is commonly used as a blanket solution to any and all medical issues. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 163.) For individuals with chronic medical conditions, it can

⁷² See also Legal Aid Service of Broward County, *Complaint and Request for Investigation Glades Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida Physical Abuse, Inappropriate Use of Segregation, Denial of Medical and Mental Health Care and Lack of Attorney Access* (January 8, 2018), <https://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/pdf/2018/OIG-complaint-against-glades.pdf>.

take months of grievances and sick calls to receive diagnostic testing or to see a specialist off-site. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 142.)

251. Because Glades fails to meet detained individual's medical needs under normal circumstances, the jail is ill-suited to provide adequate medical treatment amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. This failure is so severe that it cannot be remedied quickly to respond to COVID-19, especially in a time when healthcare resources are in high demand.

252. For years, detained women and men have reported "that officers routinely misuse pepper spray, use excessive force and racial slurs, and overuse isolation in a retaliatory manner." (Appx I, Exh. K, at 164-65). One detained individual with respiratory problems reported being pepper sprayed in an isolation cell, which triggered an asthma attack. (Appx I, Exh. K, at 165.) The lack of ventilation and the unsanitary conditions further aggravated his respiratory difficulties. (*Id.*)

253. Detention center staff have failed to train detained individuals about hygiene measures designed to limit the spread of COVID-19. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 30 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez ¶ 15 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50). The only information detained individuals receive about COVID-19 is from the television or posters on the wall. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 30, 33 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38).

254. Detained individuals are now being provided with half the amount of soap they are normally provided with, equaling one 4-ounce bottle per week, when they were previously provided with two bottles per week. *See* Roseline Ostine Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. BB, at 168-72);

Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62); Conlin Dec. (Appx I, Exh. J, at 126-30) Detained individuals are forced to ration this small portion of soap, one bottle, to cover showering and hand washing for an entire week. Id; Franklin Ramon Gonzalez ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

255. The facility is not providing hand sanitizer, and there is none available for purchase in commissary. *See* Roseline Ostine Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. BB, at 168-72); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 7-9 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62); Tahimi Perez Dec. ¶ 14-15 (Appx II, Exh. W, at 139-44); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec. ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

256. Detained individuals are not provided with masks or gloves. *See* Roseline Ostine Dec. ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. BB, at 168-72); Tahimi Perez Dec. ¶¶ 8, 14 (Appx II, Exh. W, at 139-44); Conlin Dec. ¶ 17 (Appx I, Exh. J, at 126-30). Even when detained individuals attempt to make their own masks out of their personal belongings, such as t-shirts, the guards tell them that they are not allowed to cover their faces with anything. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 19 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec. ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

257. There are no gloves or masks available for purchase in commissary. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 29 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 7, 9 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62); Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec. ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. X, at 145-50).

258. Although some Glades staff have recently started wearing masks, the majority of the Glades staff do not use masks or gloves. *See* Roseline Ostine Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. BB, at 168-72); Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 25 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶

14 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62).

259. Although the staff are not using the proper protective gear, they still enter the living units, touch the detained individuals, their personal belongings, and the food trays. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 25, 34 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Gerardo Vargas Dec. ¶ 15 (Appx II, Exh. Y, at 151-56); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62). The detained individuals have not witnessed staff washing their hands. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 31 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62).

260. Many staff at Glades live in the surrounding communities where there are confirmed cases of COVID-19. Staff's failure to use proper protective gear makes it all the more likely that COVID-19 will be spread from the staff to detained individuals.

261. Detained individuals prepare meals for the entire detained population despite the lack of masks and gloves, and many of the detained individuals preparing the food have been exhibiting signs of sickness, such as coughing. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 22 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62). The detained individuals also clean the facility, and they do not wear gloves or masks while they clean. *See* Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec. ¶ 23 (Appx II, Exh. V, at 131-38); Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec. ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. Z, at 157-62). The walls of the facility are full of mold, so it is not clear how often or well they are being cleaned. *See* Irvin Mendoza Silis Dec. ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. AA, at 163-67).

262. Many detained individuals in the pods are exhibiting flu-like symptoms, including coughing and sneezing. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Some
detained individuals are coughing up blood. *See* [REDACTED]

263. Despite these flu-like symptoms, there have been no known COVID-19 tests done in the Glades facility. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
264. This remains true even among the population of detained individuals with medical vulnerabilities, including those with hypertension, diastolic heart failure, COPD, obesity, asthma, diabetes, and HIV. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
265. The medically vulnerable are not being protected by being moved away from the general population or from those who are exhibiting flu-like symptoms. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
266. As of a couple days ago, 12 detained individuals were put into a “quarantine pod.” [REDACTED]

267. Detained individuals are not able to see the medical staff in a timely manner, and when they are able to see the medical staff, their temperature is not being taken. See [REDACTED]

268. One detained individual was advised by a nurse that he had the flu, but another nurse informed him that he did not. See [REDACTED]

Broward Transitional Center

269. BTC is an immigration detention center in Pompano Beach, Florida for “non-criminal and low security” detained individuals operated by a private contractor, the for-profit prison corporation The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”). (Appx I, Exh. K at 153.) GEO has its headquarters in Boca Raton, Florida and is ICE’s largest contractor, holding more than \$400 million in contracts with ICE.⁷³

270. Since it opened in 2002, “Broward has steadily grown in population capacity from 150 detained women to 700 detained women and men.” (Appx I, Exh. K at 153.). There are 595 beds for men, and 105 for women. GEO’s contract with ICE includes a 500-bed quota, meaning that ICE is contractually obligated to pay for 500 beds regardless if they are being used.⁷⁴ (Appx I, Exh. K at 153.)

⁷³ <https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/boca-ratons-geo-group-is-ices-top-contractor-10504265>.

⁷⁴ *Banking on Detention: Local Lockup Quota & the Immigrant Dragnet*, Detention Watch Network & Center for Constitutional Rights (2015), <https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20CCR%20Banking%20on%20Detention%20Report.pdf>.

271. Each room in BTC has three sets of bunkbeds—housing up to six individuals per room that generally measures 10' x 12'. All individuals in the room share a toilet, a shower and a sink. Moreover, all 700 individuals share common areas, such as the recreation area, phones, the law library, seating areas, and the cafeteria. The cafeteria holds 300 people per shift for three meals.

272. GEO's operation of BTC has been dogged by complaints including denial of medical and mental health care, using detained individuals for unpaid or cheap labor, expired and rotten food, and abusive staff. The DHS Office of Inspector General has repeatedly concluded that ICE fails to hold detention facility contractors accountable for meeting performance standards required to ensure humane conditions. DHS Office of Inspector Gen. Report OIG-19-18 (Appx I, Exh. X, at 377-412); DHS Office of Inspector Gen. Report OIG-18-67 (Appx I, Exh. Y, at 413-46).

273. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, critical medical care at BTC has been routinely delayed—sometimes for months—or denied outright. (Appx I, Exh. K at 141-43, 153.) Contractors and detained individuals have continuously reported inadequate medical and mental health care. In March 2012, an inspection documented its failure to transfer detained individuals to medical and mental health providers in a timely manner.⁷⁵ Eight years later, BTC has failed to remedy this issue. Detained individuals report having to submit multiple medical requests before being medical—typically, only to be set back to their dorm with aspirin. (Appx I, Exh. K at 153.)

⁷⁵ Office of Detention Oversight Compliance Inspection Broward Transitional Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2012), <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/odo-compliance-inspections/2012browardtransitioncenter-pompanobeach-fl-feb28-mar1-2012.pdf>.

274. At BTC, individuals with chronic medical conditions reported tremendous difficulties receiving necessary accommodations for their health problems, such as dietary accommodations. (Appx I, Exh. K at 143.) One individual remembered a man with diabetes losing a finger as a result of the inadequate medical care at BTC. (Appx I, Exh. K at 143.)

275. During the summer of 2019, there was a mumps outbreak at BTC in which detained individuals were quarantined.⁷⁶ A couple months after, an outbreak of an unknown stomach illness affected 16% of the facility's population.⁷⁷

276. Now, with the COVID-19 outbreak, BTC has placed some detained individuals in what it is calling quarantine. These detained individuals are not in an actual quarantine because they are grouped together. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

277. This "quarantined" group nonetheless uses the general population's communal space at BTC when the general population is not using this space. As a result, the quarantine group touches the telephones, tables, tablets, and chairs. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁷⁶ Letter to ICE and Wardens from AI Justice, SPLC, AAAJ, and project South (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/ltr_to_ice_and_wardens_re_covid-19_-2020.03_-_final.pdf

⁷⁷ Austen Erblat, *Stomach bug hits 115 detainees at immigration center*, South Florida Sun Sentinel (Nov. 5, 2019), <https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/pompano-beach/fl-ne-pompano-beach-flu-outbreak-immigration-detention-center-20191105-xopjvimk4fgebbzcts7ausbdwu-story.html>.

278. Detained men at BTC are sleeping in cells with five to six individuals in bunk-beds, which are not six feet apart. *See Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Sontay Funez Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97); Rosas Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14).* This sleeping arrangement makes it impossible to remain six feet apart and practice social distancing. *See Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79); Rosas Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14).*

279. The detained individuals are close to each other when they eat because the chairs are attached to the floor, they have to sit across from each other on the table, and there is not enough room to remain six feet apart. *See Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14); Rosas Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90); Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19).* Detained individuals wait in line very close to each other while waiting to enter the dining hall. *See Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85).*

280. Some detained individuals are experiencing flu like symptoms, including coughing, congestion and difficulty breathing. *See [REDACTED]*
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

281. Despite having symptoms, detained individuals have difficulty being able to see the medical staff in a timely manner. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. One detainee with an unbearable cough submitted a written request, went twice to the medical office, and then complained to a guard, before he was allowed to see a doctor. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

282. There has been no known test of COVID-19 done in the BTC facilities. *See* Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Sonay Funez Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97).

283. A recently transferred detained person reported having entered BTC with a bad cold and cough, but was never tested for COVID-19 or isolated from the general population. *See*

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

284. Detained individuals have trouble accessing medical attention, including for serious chronic conditions such as asthma. *See* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]). Medical staff have become so overwhelmed with the number of sick men detained in the facility that one doctor gave an individual his entire bottle of blood pressure medicine to take on his own, since she no longer had time to dispense his pill regularly. *See* [REDACTED]

285. At least 40 men have been brought into BTC in the past few weeks. *See* Borges Dec. at ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14). New detained people have been placed immediately into shared rooms without being isolated first. *See* Borges Dec. at ¶14 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14); Rosas Cardenas Dec. at ¶12 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90). One group of new arrivals came

about one week ago from Krome, which already had confirmed COVID-19 cases, and they were placed with the general population of BTC. *See* Betancourt Dec. at ¶13 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85). Individuals detained at BTC were told the infected person at Krome was sent home. *See* Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19).

286. There are no precautions taken to protect those who are medically vulnerable to COVID-19. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

287. Detained individuals prepare the food and clean at BTC. One detained person who previously prepared the food at BTC reported having flu like symptoms. *See* [REDACTED]. Detained individuals who work in the kitchen do not always wear masks when preparing the food and are not taught COVID-19 hygiene measures. *Id.* at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79); Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 14 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19).

288. Detained individuals have not observed greater efforts to clean in response to COVID-19. Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 15 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19). Most detained individuals are not provided with masks or gloves when they clean common areas. *See* Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08). When asked to clean their cells, only one pair of gloves is provided. *See* Sonay Funez Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97). When masks and gloves are available, they are only for cleaning, otherwise there is no access to gloves and masks. *See* Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85).

289. BTC staff not using protective gear enter living facilities and use their bare hands to touch detained individuals and their personal belongings. *See* Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 15

(Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14), Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Sosa Fletez Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Sonay Funez Dec. at ¶ 17 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97). Borges Dec. at ¶13 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14). Recently staff have used their bare hands to conduct pat downs, to give men high fives, and to touch their phones, tables, and exercise equipment. *See* Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶9 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Borges Dec. at ¶13 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14). The detained individuals have not seen staff washing their hands. *See* Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 15 (Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79); Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08).

290. Only some of the BTC staff have begun to use mask and gloves recently. *See* Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 13 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14), Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Rosas Cardinas Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90), Sonay Funez Dec. at ¶ 17 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97). Guards wear gloves when searching detainees, but do not always use them otherwise. *See* Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19).

291. Detained individuals receive only a small allocation of soap each week, which often runs out. *See* Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Sonay Funez Dec. at ¶ 11 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97); Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 7 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79). This small amount is supposed to last them for showers and hand washing, however detained individuals reported it is not enough. *See* Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II,

Exh. CC, at 173-79); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 5 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 9 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14); Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 6 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08). They have not been given hand sanitizer. *See* Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19).

292. Detained individuals have not been given any formal education about hygiene measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. *See* Bibiano Soares Dec. at ¶ 19 (Appx II, Exh. CC, at 173-79); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85); Ferreira Borges Dec. at ¶ 16 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14), Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Rosas Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90); Sosa Fletes Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. HH, at 204-08); Sonay Funez Dec. at ¶ 17 (Appx II, Exh. FF, at 191-97); Rodas Pedro Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. JJ, at 215-19). The only information they have received is from watching TV and posters on the wall. *See* Valera Ramirez Dec. at ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. GG, at 198-203); Rosas Cardenas Dec. at ¶ 8 (Appx II, Exh. EE, at 186-90).

293. Detained individuals have no access to masks or gloves, even from the commissary. Borges Dec. at ¶ 12 (Appx II, Exh. II, 209-14); Betancourt Dec. at ¶ 10 (Appx II, Exh. DD, at 18-85).

294. BTC staff rotate in and out of BTC on a regular basis. Staff generally live in the communities near BTC—areas where there many confirmed cases of COVID-19.

295. BTC has a history of outbreaks of contagious illnesses. In November of 2019, there was a stomach flu outbreak at BTC during which 115 detained persons became ill.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ <https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/pompano-beach/fl-ne-pompano-beach-flu-outbreak-immigration-detention-center-20191105-xopjvimk4fgebbzcts7ausbdwu-story.html>

296. On March 17, 2020, detained persons at BTC were subjected to a 5-hour water stoppage, during which they had no access to water to wash their hands, bathe, or use the toilet.⁷⁹

ICE's Alternatives to Detention Program

297. For over 15 years, DHS/ICE has sought and obtained congressional funding for its Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program, which uses supervised release, case management, and monitoring of individuals instead of detention.⁸⁰ ICE has repeatedly told Congress that the ATD program increases ICE’s operational effectiveness and individual compliance with release conditions.

⁷⁹ <https://www.wlrn.org/post/coronavirus-live-updates-two-broward-election-poll-workers-test-postive-covid-19#stream/0>

⁸⁰ ICE’s current ATD program is called Intensive Supervision Appearance Program III (ISAP III). The program features different levels of case management including in-person or telephonic meetings, unannounced home visits, scheduled office visits, and court and meeting alerts. Some are also enrolled in technology-based monitoring including telephonic monitoring, GPS monitoring via ankle bracelet, and smart phone application monitoring called SmartLink that uses facial recognition and location monitoring via GPS. The private contractor that operates the program for ICE is BI, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of The GEO Group, Inc. See CRS Report R45804, Immigration: Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Programs, (Jul. 8, 2019). On March 23, 2020, DHS awarded BI, Inc. a 5-year \$2.2 billion contract for continued ISAP support. <https://beta.sam.gov/opp/2479131ff88f405999e126b52ff105f5/view>

298. The DHS FY2021 Congressional Budget Justification for ICE states that it costs \$125.06 per day to jail an adult immigration in ICE custody. The average cost per ATD participant is \$4.43 per day. The DHS FY2021 funding request seeks to support 120,000 daily participants in ATD.⁸¹

299. A 2014 GAO Report found that 95% of those on full-service ATD (those that include case management) appear for their final hearings.⁸² According to 2017 contract data, supervision coupled with some case management results in a more than 99% appearance rate for all immigration court hearings, and a more than 91% appearance rate for final hearings.⁸³

300. As of April 4, 2020, ICE has 89,851 individuals enrolled in ATD, including 5,057 in the Miami area.⁸⁴

⁸¹ DHS/ICE FY2021 Congressional Budget Justification, at Operations & Support 132, 171, 173, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/u.s._immigration_and_customs_enforcement.pdf. Due to court backlogs and delays for those who are non-detained, ATD participants are enrolled for a longer period of time than the period of time that individuals remain in detention. However, even considering the average length of stay in detention and the average length of time in ATD, taxpayers are paying an average of \$4,000 more per individual detained than those released on ATD.

⁸² GAO-15-26, Alternatives to Detention, at 30 (Nov. 2014), available at <https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf>.

⁸³ The Real Alternatives to Detention (June 2019), available at <https://www.womensrefugee-commission.org/images/zdocs/The-Real-Alternatives-to-Detention-June-2019-FINAL-v-2.pdf>.

⁸⁴ ICE website, Detention Management, <https://www.ice.gov/detention-management#tab2>.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

301. The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Its protections extend to every person within the nation’s borders regardless of immigration status. *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77, (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.”).

A. Due Process Right to Reasonably Safe Non-Punitive Civil Detention

302. When the government takes a person into custody and detains him against the person’s will, the Constitution imposes upon the government a duty to assume responsibility for that detainee’s safety and general wellbeing. See *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). Under the Eighth Amendment, the Government must provide criminal detainees with basic human needs, including reasonable safety. *Id.*

303. The government violates the Eighth Amendment if it confines a criminal detainee in unsafe conditions. *Id.* at 33.

304. When the government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. See *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

305. As civil detainees, Petitioners are entitled to more considerate treatment than criminal detainees, whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. See *Marsh v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.*, 330 F. App’x 179, 182 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)).

306. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits punishment of people in civil custody. *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); *Magluta v. Samples*, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004); *Hamm v. Dekalb Cty.*, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing *Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977)).

307. To establish that a particular condition or restriction of detention constitutes impermissible punishment, a petitioner must show either (1) an expressed intent to punish; or (2) lack of a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, from which an intent to punish may be inferred. See *Wolfish*, 441 U.S. at 538. Absent an explicit intention to punish, a court must apply a two-part test: “First, a court must ask whether any ‘legitimate goal’ was served by the prison conditions. Second, it must ask whether the conditions are ‘reasonably related’ to that goal.” *Jacoby v. Baldwin Cty.*, 835 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2016). “[I]f conditions are so extreme that less harsh alternatives are easily available, those conditions constitute ‘punishment.’” *Telfair v. Gilberg*, 868 F.Supp. 1396, 1412 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (citing *Wolfish*, 441 U.S. at 538-39 n.20).

308. “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). The government must provide detained individuals with basic necessities, such as adequate medical care, food, clothing, and shelter; the failure to provide these necessities violates due process. *Hamm*, 774 F.2d at 1573; *Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty.*, 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005).

309. At a minimum, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits Respondents' deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm that would rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation in the post-conviction criminal context. *Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.*, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) ("[T]he due process rights of a [detainee] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner."); see also *Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty.*, 50 F. 3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995).

310. To demonstrate that Respondents are acting with deliberate indifference, Petitioners must show exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm of which Respondents are aware and have disregarded. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837-38 (1994); *Marbury v. Warden*, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019); *Hale*, 50 F.3d at 1582.

311. The government violates the Eighth Amendment when it "ignore[s] a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year," including "exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease," even when "the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms." *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 33; see also *id.* at 34 (citing with approval *Gates v. Collier*, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974), which held that prisoners were entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment when they showed, *inter alia*, the mingling of "inmates with serious contagious diseases" with other prison inmates).

312. Thus, the harm that Petitioners fear—i.e., that their confinement will result in a COVID-19 infection that will seriously injure and possibly kill them—need not become a reality to establish a violation of their constitutional rights. Courts do not require a plaintiff to "await a

tragic event” before seeking relief from a condition of confinement that unconstitutionally endangers them. *See Helling*, 509 U.S. at 33 (holding prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim could be based upon possible future harm to health, as well as present harm).

313. “Nor does it matter that some inmates may not be affected by the condition, and that the harm is thus, in a sense, only potential harm. The Court has found an Eighth Amendment violation ‘even though it was not alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even though the possible infection might not affect all of those exposed.’” *Tittle v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n*, 10 F.3d 1535, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 33).

B. The *Accardi* Doctrine

314. When the government has promulgated “[r]egulations with the force and effect of law,” those regulations “supplement the bare bones” of federal statutes. *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 266, 268 (1954) (reversing in immigration case after review of warrant for deportation). Agencies must follow their own “existing valid regulations,” even where government officers have broad discretion, such as in the area of immigration. *Id.* at 268; *see also Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“[I]t is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where [they] are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”); *Battle v. FAA*, 393 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“*Accardi* has come to stand for the proposition that agencies may not violate their own rules and regulations to the prejudice of others.”). Breaches of *Accardi*’s rule constitute violations of both the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

315. While violations of “internal agency procedures” do not always require a remedy, *Accardi*’s rule applies with full force when “the rights or interests of the objecting party” are “affected.” *Monitlla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d. Cir. 1991) (citing cases) (“*Accardi* doctrine is premised on fundamental notions of fair play underlying the concept of due process”); *see also Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 378 F.3d 541, 545-46 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that an *Accardi* violation may be a due process violation, and the government’s action may be set aside pursuant to the APA); *Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force*, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) (“An agency’s failure to follow its own regulations . . . may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.”).

C. State Created Danger

316. The Due Process Clause “imposes a duty on state actors to protect or care for citizens in when the state affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the individual would not otherwise have faced.” *Gregory v. City of Rogers, Ark.*, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

317. The government violates an individual’s right to due process when it (1) “affirmatively place[s] [the] individual in danger,” (2) by “acting with ‘deliberate indifference to [a] known or obvious danger.’” *Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield*, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Munger v. City of Glasgow*, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000); *L.W. v. Grubbs*, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996)); *Jones v. Phyfer*, 761 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1985), reh’g denied, 768 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 1985) (a constitutional right to protection by the state exists when there is a showing that the victim faces a special danger distinguishable from that of the public at large).

318. “A duty of protection arises where the state has a custodial relationship with the individual, arising from such circumstances as incarceration in prison or involuntary commitment in a mental institution.” *Davis v. Carter*, 555 F.3d 979, 982 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). The only relationships that automatically give rise to a governmental duty to protect individuals from harm under the substantive due process clause are custodial relationships through which the government deprives individuals of their liberty and thus of their ability to take care of themselves. *See White v. Lemacks*, 183 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).

319. The government acts with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger when it recognizes an unreasonable risk and actually knowingly exposes the petitioner. An unreasonable risk includes future harm caused by conditions of confinement. *See Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT ONE - ACCARDI DOCTRINE (FIFTH AMENDMENT/APA) – VIOLATION OF DETENTION STANDARDS

320. Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

321. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, due process and the basic principle of administrative law dictate that rules promulgated by a federal agency regulating the rights and interests of others are controlling upon the agency. That doctrine is premised on the fundamental notion of fair play underlying the concept of due process.

322. The *Accardi* doctrine applies with particular force when “the rights of individuals are affected.” *Morton*, 415 U.S. at 235.

323. Krome, BTC and Glades are all subject to National Detention Standards that are issued by ICE, which set forth the medical care that must be provided to individuals in immigration detention. Both Krome and BTC are subject to ICE's 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards ("PBNDS"). *See* (Appx I, Exh. N, at 253.)⁸⁵ Glades is subject to ICE's National Detention Standards ("NDS"). (Appx. I, Exh. K, at 152, 156.) The current governing version of the NDS is the 2019 National Detention Standards for Non-Dedicated Facilities.⁸⁶

324. Section 4.3(II)(10) of the PBNDS requires that "Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for the prevention and control of infectious and communicable diseases shall be followed." (Appx, Exh. N, at 253.) The PBNDS also provides that "[f]acilities shall comply with current and future plans implemented by federal, state or local authorities addressing specific public health issues including communicable disease reporting requirements." (Appx, Exh. N, at 256-57.) Similarly, section 1.1(I) of the NDS, covered "facilit[ies] will operate in accordance with all applicable regulations and codes, such as those of . . . the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)." (Appx I, Exh. O, at 304).⁸⁷

325. Respondents have failed to follow their duty to comply with the PBNDS and NDS, which in turn require compliance with CDC guidelines and federal, state and local laws. Respondents have neither reduced the population of Krome, Glades, and BTC. Nor have they done anything to ensure social distancing and proper hygiene.

⁸⁵ Full copy available at: <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Supersession noted at: <https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2000>.

⁸⁷ Full copy available at: <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2019/nds2019.pdf>.

326. Respondents have failed to comply with the CDC guidelines. Respondents have not “[e]nsure[d] that sufficient stocks of hygiene supplies, cleaning supplies, PPE, and medical supplies . . . are on hand.” *Compare* CDC Guidance at 7 (Appx I, Exh. F, at 54); *with* Declarations of Individuals Detained at all three facilities: Krome (Warsane Dec., Hasan Dec., Farah Dec., Arrak Dec.); Glades (Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec., Tahimi Perez Dec., Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec., Gerardo Vargas Dec., and Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec.); and BTC (Valera Ramirez Dec., Sosa Fletes Dec., Sontay Funez Dec., Rosas Cardenas Dec., Betancourt Dec. Ferreira Borges Dec., and Bibiano Soares Dec) (Appx II).

327. Respondents have not implemented the recommended cleaning and disinfecting practices. *Compare* CDC Guidance at 9 (Appx I, Exh. F, at 56); *with* Declarations of Individuals Detained at all three facilities: Krome (Warsane Dec., Hasan Dec., Farah Dec., Arrak Dec.); Glades (Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec., Tahimi Perez Dec., Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec., Gerardo Vargas Dec., and Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec.); and BTC (Valera Ramirez Dec., Sosa Fletes Dec., Sontay Funez Dec., Rosas Cardenas Dec., Betancourt Dec. Ferreira Borges Dec., and Bibiano Soares Dec) (Appx II).

328. Respondents have not implemented the recommended hygiene practices. *Compare* CDC Guidance at 10 (Appx I, Exh. F, at 57); *with* Declarations of Individuals Detained at all three facilities: Krome (Warsane Dec., Hasan Dec., Farah Dec., Arrak Dec.); Glades (Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec., Tahimi Perez Dec., Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec., Gerardo Vargas Dec., and Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec.); and BTC (Valera Ramirez Dec., Sosa Fletes Dec., Sontay Funez Dec., Rosas Cardenas Dec., Betancourt Dec. Ferreira Borges Dec., and Bibiano Soares Dec) (Appx II).

329. Respondents have not implemented adequate social distancing practices. *Compare* CDC Guidance at 11 (Appx I, Exh. F, at 58); *with* Declarations of Individuals Detained at all three facilities: Krome (Warsane Dec., Hasan Dec., Farah Dec., Arrak Dec.); Glades (Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec., Tahimi Perez Dec., Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec., Gerardo Vargas Dec., and Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec.); and BTC (Valera Ramirez Dec., Sosa Fletes Dec., Sontay Funez Dec., Rosas Cardenas Dec., Betancourt Dec. Ferreira Borges Dec., and Bibiano Soares Dec) (Appx II).

330. Respondents have not communicated clearly and frequently with Petitioners regarding COVID-19 and how they can contribute to risk reduction. *Compare* CDC Guidance at 12 (Appx I, Exh. F, at 59); *with* Declarations of Individuals Detained at all three facilities: Krome (Warsane Dec., Hasan Dec., Farah Dec., Arrak Dec.); Glades (Dairon Barredo Sanchez Dec., Tahimi Perez Dec., Franklin Ramon Gonzalez Dec., Gerardo Vargas Dec., and Francisco Rivero Valeron Dec.); and BTC (Valera Ramirez Dec., Sosa Fletes Dec., Sontay Funez Dec., Rosas Cardenas Dec., Betancourt Dec. Ferreira Borges Dec., and Bibiano Soares Dec) (Appx II).

331. Respondents' cohorting practices violate CDC guidance and increase the threat posed to Petitioners. The CDC's Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) states that cohort quarantine "should only be practiced if there are no other available options" and that "[c]ohorting multiple quarantined close contacts of a COVID-19 case could transmit COVID-19 from those who are infected to those who are uninfected." Respondents violate the CDC Guidelines by refusing to release people and instead keeping them confined

in close sleeping, eating, and living quarters at Krome, Glades, and BTC. Further, because Respondents can and should release Petitioners and those similarly situated, “cohort quarantine” is not the only “available option.”

332. Cohorting is not the same as quarantine or medical isolation and the CDC makes it clear that cohorting is to be used only as a last resort in those “correctional facilities and detention centers do not have enough individual cells” for quarantine or medical isolation. Interim Guidance, at 3, 15 (Appx, Exh. F, at 50, 62). The CDC and other medical expert opinions confirm that cohorting individuals who have not been confirmed to be infected with COVID-19 “puts everyone at very high risk of contracting and spreading COVID-19.” Shin Decl., ¶ 33 (Exh. 2).

333. On March 31, 2020, the President updated the guidance, renaming it “30 Days to Slow the Spread,” and along with the White House Coronavirus Task Force urged Americans to continue to adhere to the CDC guidelines and expand community mitigation efforts.” On April 1, 2020, Governor DeSantis issued a shelter-in-place order for the state of Florida, effective April 3, 2020. Exec. Order No. 20-91.

334. As Dr. Shin explains “[t]he only effective strategies to limit wide-spread impact of COVID-19 are public health strategies. These include containment efforts like early identification, contact tracing, isolation and quarantine measures, and intensive use of personal protective equipment. Unfortunately, due to limited testing capacity and public health resources combined with wide-spread community spread, mitigation efforts like social distancing and scrupulous hand and personal hygiene are critical to limit the spread of COVID-19.” Shin Dec., ¶ 12 (Exh. 2). Dr. Shin also explains that “[t]here is no way for immigration detention facilities to

comply with CDC guidelines on social distancing and quarantining unless Respondents release detained men and women on a large scale.” *Id.* at ¶¶ 39-40. Dr. Shin concluded that it is “my professional opinion that failure to release during the COVID-19 pandemic is a violation of the CDC guidelines and will result in continued and wide-spread infection.” *Id.*

335. Dr. Shin’s conclusions are consistent with every other public health expert issued early warnings about the spread of COVID-19 and the need for the federal, state and local governments to employ social distancing mitigation efforts. *See Exh. , Shin Decl., ¶ 6 (Exh. 2).* The consequences of the failure of federal, state and local government to adhere to the early warning by public health officials have been borne out in the United States. *Id.* at ¶ 40. As of the date of this Petition, there are 525,704 number of confirmed cases in the United States and 20,486 people have died.⁸⁸

336. As is detailed *supra*, Respondents have failed to follow their duty to comply with the PBNDS and NDS, which in turn require compliance with CDC guidelines and federal, state and local laws. Respondents have neither reduced the population of Krome, Glades, and BTC. Nor have they done anything to ensure social distancing and proper hygiene.

337. Respondents have an obligation under the PBNDS and the NDS to protect the Petitioners. The PBNDS and the NDS require Respondents protect Petitioners by following the CDC guidelines, complying with federal, state or local plans, and reports requirements.

⁸⁸ <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html>

338. Petitioners have not been protected, and the Respondents' violate the *Accardi* doctrine by failing to comply with its own obligations in violation of the APA and Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

**COUNT TWO - FIFTH AMENDMENT – VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO
REASONABLE SAFETY**

339. Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

340. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals in immigration detention the right to be free from punishment. The government violates this guarantee when conditions of confinement lack a reasonable relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose, *i.e.* when a custodian's actions are excessive in relation to their purpose.

341. Respondents' continued detention of Petitioners during the COVID-19 pandemic is excessive in relation to any legitimate governmental purpose. Less harsh measures are available to satisfy any government interest in continuing to detain Plaintiffs, including release with conditions. Under these circumstances, Respondents' detention of Petitioners amount to impermissible punishment.

342. Conditions of confinement for individuals in immigration detention also violate the Fifth Amendment when the government fails, with deliberate indifference, to safeguard the health and safety of those in custody. The government acts with deliberate indifference when it knowingly exposes an individual in its custody to a substantial risk of serious harm.

343. Respondents have subjected Petitioners to conditions of confinement that create a substantial risk of contracting a serious case of COVID-19, for which there is no known vaccine, treatment, or cure. Respondents know or should be aware of the fact that Petitioners' underlying

conditions render them especially vulnerable to severe illness or even death if they contract COVID-19. Respondents are therefore knowingly subjecting Petitioners to an unreasonable risk of serious harm, in violation of constitutional due process.

344. Respondents' continued detention of Petitioners fails to adequately protect Petitioners from the risks of contracting COVID-19.

345. Petitioners' ongoing confinement lacks a reasonable relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose and is excessive in relation to their purpose.

346. Respondents have exposed Petitioners to a substantial risk of serious harm.

347. Respondents have known of or disregarded the substantial risk of harm to Petitioners' health and safety.

348. Respondents have acted with deliberate indifference to Petitioners' health and safety.

349. Respondents' continued detention of Petitioners violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as detention has become punitive and is not reasonably safe.

COUNT THREE - FIFTH AMENDMENT – STATE-CREATED DANGER

350. Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

351. The government acts with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger when it recognizes an unreasonable risk and actually intends to expose petitioners to such risks without regard to the consequences to petitioners. An unreasonable risk includes future harm caused by conditions of confinement. *See Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Respondents have not complied its obligations to follow the CDC guidelines, and affirmatively

place Petitioners at greater risk of contracting COVID-19 by implemented practices that transfer people into and out of facilities, and employs cohort quarantining approach – that drastically increases the danger of the virus spreading. Respondents have acted with deliberate indifference to the clear elevated levels of threat caused to Petitioners.

352. Respondents have affirmatively placed Petitioners in danger by forcing them into a position more dangerous than it found them, exposing them to elevated dangerous by failing to following CDC guidelines including by transferring people among facilities and improperly using cohort quarantines in a manner that places Petitioners in a more dangerous situation that it found them. Respondents made the affirmative decision to not release Petitioners or use ATDs, and instead implemented cohort quarantines in a manner that drastically increase the possibility of transmission, infection, and facility-wide outbreak by grouping together people who have already been exposed to the virus. *See* Shin Decl. ¶40 (Exh. 2); Greer Decl., ¶¶34-35 (Exh. 3).

353. Respondents continue to detain Petitioners without taking necessary precautions to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission. Respondents have thus exposed Petitioners to a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 than they would have otherwise faced.

354. Respondents continued to actively disregard the threat of the pandemic. Petitioners are detained in conditions that expose them to a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. Respondents are confining Petitioners in close proximity to other detainees and ICE officers, rendering Petitioners entirely unable to practice necessary social distancing.

355. ICE officers are failing to take necessary precautions, to avoid transmitting COVID-19 to Petitioners, detainees, and other officers. Respondents' ongoing detention of Petitioners thus continues to expose them to a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 than they would

face if they were not in detention and were able to take necessary precautions to protect themselves.

356. Respondents have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate indifference to the known and obvious risk of COVID-19 transmission.

357. Respondents implemented a cohort quarantine approach that does not comply with CDC guidelines and drastically increases the risk of COVID-19 exposure and contraction, at the time when the federal government and State of Florida had both declared public health emergencies. Despite being well-aware of both the risks of community transmission of COVID-19 and the preventive measures necessary to slow that transmission, Respondents acted without regard to the consequences to Petitioners by failing to implement a plan calculated to meaningfully comply with CDC guidelines, instead exposing the Petitioners to drastically increased risk of exposure by defying CDC guidelines in the use of cohort quarantining and actively transferring detainees among facilities with confirmed cases detainees and facility employees having contracted COVID-19. *See* Shin Decl. ¶40 (Exh. 2).

358. For these reasons, Petitioners' detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because Respondents affirmatively subjected Petitioners to an unreasonable risk of danger, greater danger than before Respondents acted, with deliberate indifference to employing policies that drastically increase the risk of Petitioners' contracting COVID-19.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE Petitioners request that the Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioners, and the class they represent, from Krome, Glades, or BTC, until the Court has decided this action;
- c. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the ground that Respondents' continued detention of Petitioners, and the class they represent, violates the Due Process Clause and order the immediate release of Petitioners and the class they represent, with appropriate precautionary public health measures;
- d. Issue injunctive relief ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioners and all similarly situated detainees in Krome Service Processing Center, Glades County Detention Center, and Broward Transitional Center with appropriate precautionary public health measures, on the grounds that continued detention violates the constitutional Due Process rights of Petitioners and the class they represent;
- e. Issue a declaration that Respondents' continued detention of Petitioners and all class members creates an undue increased risk of severe illness or death, and thus violates the Due Process Clause;
- f. Issue an order prohibiting Respondents from placing new detainees in the Krome Service Processing Center, Glades County Detention Center, and Broward Transitional Center until COVID-19 no longer poses a threat in Florida.
- g. Award Petitioners their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees in this action under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412,

and on any other basis justified under law; and

h. Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem fit and proper.

Dated: April 13, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Rebecca Sharpless

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PETITIONER-PLAINTIFFS' VERIFICATION

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner-Plaintiffs because I am one of the Petitioner-Plaintiffs' attorneys. I have discussed with the Petitioners-Plaintiffs' legal team the events described in this Petition. On the basis of those discussions, on information and belief, I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

By: /s/ Rebecca Sharpless

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